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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the hostility towards the state in economic and related aspects
of national and international life in the wake of the end of the cold war
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appear to be tempering.' It is now generally accepted that the state must do
comparatively less, but more effectively. What is less can be contested, but
the processes for state activity should not be as controversial. Much of the
literature on governmental process is cast in generalities sometimes based
on simplistic assumptions.
This work aims to clarify, simplify and give some coherence to the
discourse. It argues that the operation of the state in national and to some
extent, international, economic activity in developing countries must be
through effective governing structures and processes, or what is generally
referred to as "good governance." The principal objective is to identify and
delimit the central features of what constitutes good governance. The
article postulates four positions. First, that it is Herculean to have a valuefree, all embracing, but workable definition of good governance.2 Second,
that the idea of good governance does not owe its genesis to the
international development institutions, nor to the post cold war era. Third,
that there are differences and similarities between the concept, articulation
and practice of governance before the late 1980s and the period thereafter.
The final argument here is that governance is a principle which gives rise
to appendages such as democracy, rule of law, effective bureaucracy,
decentralization and discretion. In varying degrees, these elements may be
needed and are also evidenced not only in an effective central political
regime but also in sectoral economic management. For the purposes of
practicality and coherence, the energy industry would be used wherever an
illustration or example is needed in this work.
II.

DEFINITION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE?

The term governance has not as yet been deeply articulated. It has been
used mainly by international financial and development institutions to
depict improper or unsatisfactory functioning of governmental machinery
or the need for more efficient administration.3 There has been varied, if
1. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD
(1997) [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. Contrast this with earlier World Development
Reports and other publications by the World Bank, especially those for 1989 and 1996. See also
TONY KILLICK, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS IN ACTION (1978) [hereinafter KILLICK, DEVELOPMENT

ECONOMICS]. But see TONY KILLICK, A REACnON To FAR: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF
THE STATE IN DEVELOPING COuNTIuEs (1990). See also JONATHAN H. FRIMPONG-ANSAH, THE
VAMPIRE STATE IN AFRICA (1991).
2. Unless the context suggests otherwise, governance and good governance would be used

interchangeably throughout this work without an implication of a change in meaning.
3. For example, in explaining Africa's development problems, the World Bank stated that
"Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance." See WORLD
BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROwTH 60 (1989) [hereinafter

SuB-SAHARAN AFmCAj.
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perfimctory, definitions of the term governance. The World Bank argued
that "by Governance [it] is meant the exercise of political power to manage
a nation's affairs." 4 This might be a definition aimed more for general
consumption than for the World Bank's own purposes. This is because,
by its legal mandate, the World Bank is restrained from delving into
political matters and so in "analyzing governance, the World Bank draws
a clear distinction between the concept's political and economic
dimensions."5 In a more measured approach, the World Bank defined
governance interms of the manner of exercising power for economic and
social development.' Although effort is made at emphasizing the economic
and social aspects while excluding the political undertones of governance,
the World Bank is unable to effectively distance its conception of
governance for its specific purposes, from the political paraphernalia of the
term. Furthermore, the definition is silent on the operation of governance
in small micro contexts as energy management, local government and
international relations. Another attempt, which is more descriptive than
definitional, is that which states governance as "the conscious management
of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public
realm." This definition appears sensitive to normative values in the
prescription for governance. It places emphasis on the attainment of
legitimacy without delving into the methods of attaining that legitimacy.
The merit of this approach, for the purposes of this work, is that sub
sectors like energy may not be satisfactorily managed in isolation of the
broader political and institutional structures. The drawback, however, is
that it places less emphasis on the style of management so far as it
ultimately realizes the goal of legitimacy.
Most of the work on governance appears satisfied with a description or
provision of a shopping list of ingredients for good governance." Such
elements include accountability, transparency, anti-corruption, rule of law,
advancement for women, democracy and decentralization.9 These concepts
are themselves colossal and have not been subjected to sophisticated
4. Id.
5.

WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE vii (1994).

6. Id. at xiv. This definition was first propounded in WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT 1 (1992).
7. GORAN HYDEN & MICHAEL BRATTON, GOVERNANCE AND POLmCS INAFRICA 7 (1993).
8. See United Nations Development Program, Governance Policy Paper (last modified Jan.
1997) <http'//magnatundp.org/policy/> [hereinafter UNDP]. An exception to this trend is Ann

Seidman et al., Building Sound National Frameworks For Development and Social Change, 4
1999)
May
modified
I (last
J.
ONLINE
CEPML & P.
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/joumal/htinlarticle4-I.html> (providing a synthesis of these
articles).
9. See UNDP, supra note 8.
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analyses in the light of governance. There are a number of reasons why
attempts at a definition of good governance may be infirm at birth. For one
thing, the idea is heavily value-laden. It is also very general in its
orientation, thereby admitting of a multiplicity of issues and pains at
rejecting anything. The elements of good governance are also not without
contestation in themselves. Beyond that, elements such as rule of law and
equity or efficiency may run counter to each other in certain
circumstances. For example, a policy to provide electric power to an
economically depressed part of the country may be inefficient in the short
run but may be equitable. It is for these reasons that this work would not
define the term "good governance" at this stage. It would, however,
suggest a limitation of the essentials of good governance to the following
concepts- democracy, rule of law, effective bureaucracy, discretion, and
decentralization. It is contended that these concepts have sufficient
capacity to accommodate such issues as transparency, accountability, anticorruption, civil society, human rights and others. More importantly, the
proposed elements would provide an adequate and interesting framework
for the application of good governance to energy resource development.
First, a brief outline of the origin and chronological development of the
term good governance.
III. GOOD GOVERNANCE: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

The contemporary origin of the term is attributed to the World Bank. 0
In his foreword to the 1989 World Development Report, the Bank's
President stated that "private sector initiative and market mechanisms are
important, but they must go hand-in-hand with GoodGovernance."" This
is said to represent the first significant mention of the term.' Indeed, the
entire report contained an extensive reference to what can be described as
the substance of the term.' 3 In 1992, the World Bank published a report Governance and Development - which in many respects can be said to
represent the promulgation of good governance as a major variable in

10. See Amado Tolentino, Good Governance Through PopularParticipationin Sustainable
Development, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 136 (Konrad Ginther et
al., eds., 1995) [hereinafter SustainableDevelopment]; WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD
BANK'S EXPERIENCE vii (1994).

11. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, supra note 3, at xii.
12. See WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at vii. Besides reports or works which had Good
Governance as its subject or theme.
13. The substance of Good Governance includes transparency, public accountability,

decentralization, working judiciary, etc. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supranote I. These
matters are discussed in detail below. Id It was almost ten years after the issue of governance was
broached by the World Bank that it formed the subject of its development report. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/2
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economic development. It discussed in more detail some of the signposts
of good governance as perceived by the World Bank. These include public
sector management, legal framework, accountability and transparency.
Following closely to the 1992 publication, the World Bank in 1994
described some of its experiences with the working of the term in concrete
situations.' 4 In that material, the World Bank indicated its sensitivity to the
political dimensions of governance and its restraint in that regard. It did,
however, confirm the consultative role it plays with various governments
and other funding agencies in governance matters. Finally, in a bold
acknowledgment of the critical role the state plays in economic
development, the World Bank in 1997 announced that the state apparatus,
combined with good governance is a conditio sine qua non to
development."
Apart from the World Bank, a number of development-oriented
institutions have paid attention to the issue of governance. At about the
same period as the World Bank was concerned about good governance, so
also was its sister organization, the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Admittedly, given its preoccupation° with macro economic management
issues, the IMF has been less conspicuous in its interest in good
governance. In 1997, however, the IMF decided to incorporate governance
as a criterion for assistance. 6 It further proposed to coordinate its concerns
on governance with other bilateral and multilateral funding sources.1 "
Some of these funding agencies have themselves touched on the issue of
good governance. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
declared that "it is only with good governance that we can find solutions
to poverty, inequity and insecurity."' The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also stated its preparedness to rely on
governance as a test for assistance to poor countries. 9 The African
14. See World Bank, supranote 5.
15. See WORLD BANK, THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD (1997). Besides these
publications, the World Bank also released materials dealing with governance at various times.
Examples include, LEILA FRISCHTAK, ANTINONIES OF DEVELOPMENT: GOVERNANcE CAPACITY
AND ADJUSTMENT RESPONSES (1993); LANDELL-MILLS & ISMAIL SERAOELDIN, GOVERNANCE AND
THE EXTERNAL FACTOR (1992).
16. See generally IMF, Good Governance: The IMF's Role (last modified July 2, 1997)

<http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ftexrp/govem/govindex.htm> [hereinafter IMF]; International
Monetary Fund: Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency - Declaration of Principles, April
16,1998, 37 I.L.M. 942, 942 (1998) [hereinafter IMP Code of Good Practices].
17. See IMF, supra note 16; IMF Code of Good Practices, supranote 16, at 942.
18. See UNDP, supra note 8, at I.
19. The European Union also resolved in 1991 to condition its development relationships
with poor countries on good governance. See P.J.I.M. de Waart, SecuringAccess to Safe Drinking
Water through Trade andInternationalMigration,in THE SCARCITY OF WATER: EMERGING LEGAL
AND POLICY RESPONSES 116-17 (Edward Brans et. al., eds. 1997).
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Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, bilateral development
agencies such as the British Overseas Development Agency, the Danish
Development Agency, the United States Development Agency and others,
have all, at various times and occasions since the late 1980s, stressed the
importance they attach to governance as a critical factor in development.2"
Compared to the heyday of the Law and Development movement in the
1960s and 1970s, there appears to be a dearth of academic constituency for
a lively discourse on good governance. 2 This hypothesis notwithstanding,
there is a noticeable corpus of research work on the subject.22 There appear
to be two trends in the discussion: those who emphasize the domestic
dynamics of good governance, and others who point to the international
dimensions. The first group argues for stringent reforms in developing
countries which are seen not to be making sufficient progress towards
good governance. 23 The second category sees an emerging international
juridical requirement for democratic governance.24 Both positions do stress
a patent, and to a certain extent, passionate husbandry of developing
countries by the industrialized ones using good governance as a critical
benchmark.
It is hardly controvertible that the principle or concept of good
governance, as understood in the 1990s owes its flourish largely to the
international financial and development institutions. It is, however,
misleading to say that the idea was conceived or originated from these

20. See THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS ININTERNATIONAL LAW 83-139 (1995).

21. One reason for the apparent lack of enthusiasm in academia for the debate on good
governance is the virtual absence of an opposing wing to the proposition that good governance is
essential for development. Another reason may be that the features of good governance are almost
identical to those already discussed by modernization theorists. A third factor could be the fairly
recent focus on good governanceper se.

22. Tolentino, supranote 10.
23. Patrick McAuslan, GoodGovernanceandAidinAfrica,40 J.AFR. L. 168, 168-82(1996).
24. See FRANCK, supra note 20. In 1994, the UN and the Organization of American States
refused to recognize the military junta that overthrew the democratically elected government of
Haiti and called for the forcible removal of the junta. See Peter Uvin & Isabelle Biagiotti, Global
Governance and the "New" PoliticalConditionality in 2 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF
MULTILATERiSM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 377, 384-88 (1996). The international wing
of the governance discourse can be seen beyond the political or individual countries' or regional
responses to events in any one country. The UN, the ICJ, the WTO, the World Bank, IMF and
regional organizations such as the EU, MERCOSUR, OAU, OAS, the Commonwealth, and
ECOWAS, may all be seen as institutions of global governance seeking to facilitate the
harmonization of national policies in various fields. See Michael J. Trebilcock, What Makes Poor
Countries Poor?: The Role of InstitutionalCapital in Economic Development, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 15 (Buscaglia et al., eds., 1997); see also The Charter of Paris for

aNew Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190, 193.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/2
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bodies.25 The substance or elements of governance have immemorable
origin.26 In the early twentieth century, without necessarily using the term
governance, Max Weber for example, outlined the functions of a
bureaucracy that would facilitate development. 2' He called for the strict
observance of rule of law and legal rationality and advised against
admixture of private interests with the public responsibilities of the
bureaucrat. 2 ' In the 1960s, the modernists, largely under the sponsorship
of the United States, researched and took the message of the place of law
in efficient administration to the newly independent developing
countries. 29 To the extent that law is passed and enforced by a branch of
government, an advocacy for a place for law in economic and social
development is a discourse about governance. Indeed, academic works
were done not only on the substance of law and development, but some
have also explicitly used the term 'governance' in their titles and other
significant parts.30 Contrary to the assertion that the IMF and the World
Bank invented or inaugurated good governance, the two institutions have
traditionally argued against, or resisted calls for roles that they interpreted
as political and beyond their respective mandates, which in fact border
significantly on governance.3 The "new" good governance championed
by the international development institutions may be described as the third
phase of the discourse. The first in the twentieth century was the Weberian

phenomenon and the second, the Law and Development or Modernization
movement.

25. The introduction of the concept of good governance is credited to the World Bank. See
Tolentino, supra note 10. Cf. HYDEN, supra note 7, at 5 (accepting that the popularity of the term
is owed to the World Bank's 1989 publication but also that the term "has been around in both
political and academic discourse for a long time").
. 26. The works of classical philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean J. Rousseau,
Montesquieu, Machiavelli, Plato, Confucius, J.S. Mill, Adam Smith, Karl Marx and many others,
have all hinged on the idea of proper governance of society. See GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY
OF POLITICAL THEORY (1966); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987).
27. For an interesting discussion of Weber, see WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN, THE AGE OF
BUREAUCRACY: PERSPECrIVES ON THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF MAX WEBER (1974).

28. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Eprhaim Fischoffet al. trans., 1968).
29. See Thomas Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and Legal Institutions
Help Developing Countries?, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 767, 788.
30. See e.g., Yash Ghai, The Rule ofLaw, Legitimacy and Governance,in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF LAW 253 (Ghai et al. eds., 1987); J. S. FURNIVAL, THE GOVERNANCE OF MODERN
BURMA (1958).
31. See WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at viii.
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IV. LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: REVISIONISM AND REVIVALISM

Debate on the existence of a relationship between law and economic
development assumed a salience in the second half of the twentieth
century. Prior to that period, however, the interconnectedness of the two
disciplines has had a quiet existence. There was little controversy as to
whether law begets or manages development, or that development
engenders the need for law either to manage its expansion or to control its
excesses. In the twentieth century, the relative prominence of the nexus
between law and development was accentuated by this controversy as well

as by the rapid global political and economic changes after the Second
World War. This phenomenon largely gave birth to a movement or school
of thought that came to be known as the Law and Development
fraternity.32 To be sure, the roots of the movement cannot exclude the
works of classical legal and social philosophers like Adam Smith, John
Locke, Karl Marx, and Max Weber, but for the purposes of the present
work, the focus would be on relevant twentieth century work." In this
section of the work therefore, the chronological development of the law
and development school is highlighted, and its main themes and theses
discussed. The primary objective for this is to establish the proposition that
the current preoccupation with "governance" is not a departure from, nor
unrelated to the tenets of the law and development movement.

32. Franck, supra note 29, described law and development as a "fraternity." Bruce Zagaris
termed it a"movement. See Bruce Zagaris, Law and Development or ComparativeLaw andSocial
Change: The Application of Old Concepts in the Commonwealth Caribbean, in LAW AND
DEVEL OPMENT 121, 123 (Anthony Carty ed., 1992). It did not become a full-blown category of
legal philosophy in the mode of, for example, the Realists or Positivists. The term "school" or
.movement" is therefore used in this work only to help categorize the group and to delimit the
boundaries of the discussion.
33. Though Karl Marx, for example, focused on issues that may be central to this work, the
main thrust of his work is cynical of the role of the state and law in social and economic
development, and predicts the "withering of the state." Weber accepted some of the Marxian
inclinations but described them as "ideal types." STEPHEN TuRNER &REGIS FACTOR, MAX WEBER
ASA SOCIAL THiNKER

120 (1994).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/2
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A. Max Weber on Law and Development
One of the most widely acclaimed classical works on the relationship
between law and development is that of Max Weber. In a number of
writings, particularly that on "Economy and Society," Weber discussed the
role of the law in capitalist economic development.' The aggregation of
individuals and communities to form the state has been precipitated by
economic and political factors, but these factors found veneration and
outlet in generally applicable norms and law, either forcibly imposed or
negotiated and accepted. The strengthening and integration of these units
have also been facilitated by an extension of market economy and
bureaucratization of the interactions of the groups or state. This was in turn
accentuated by the power needs of the rulers and the officials of state as
its capacity expanded, and also by the interests of those in the society who
are oriented towards power in the market.3 5 The "Prince" wanted order,
unity and cohesion of his realm, at the same time, "the bourgeois interests
[demanded] unambiguous and clear legal system, that would be free of
irrational administrative arbitrariness . . .that would also offer firm
guarantee of the legally binding character of contracts, and that, in
consequence of all these would function in a calculable way.""3 In this
context therefore, the main themes of Weber's work can be categorized
into two: rationality and bureaucracy.
1. Legal Rationality

He identified three main forms of centralized governance: traditional
rule based on blind faith in tradition and the inviolability or infallibility of

the rulers; charismatic authority based on an acknowledgment of special
or unique qualities of the leader and of the normative order established at
his behest. In both cases, there is an unquestioning obedience to the
dictates of the ruler." The quality of the particular leader and the
efficiency with which his wishes are absorbed determine whether the

governance is good or otherwise. The third form of governance

-

34. See WEBER,supra note 28.
35. Max Weber, Legal Foundations of Modern Capitalism, in THE POLITCAL ECONOMYOF
LAw 48-55 (Yash Ghai et al., eds., 1987).
36. Id at 52. Apart from that, the rulers wished to curry favor from the bourgeois groups
because they served their financial and political interests, so there was a mutual dependency
between the ruling classes and their staff (who wanted more job security) on the one hand and the
economically powerful groups on the other. Id
37. WAYNE MORRISON, JURISPRUDENCE: FROM THE GREEKS TO POST-MODERNISM 280

(1997).
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
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Rational Legal - radically departs from the previous two in that it is
based more on a systemic arrangement than personality. The essential
characteristics of the rational legal system include the following: a legal
code consisting of rationally accepted norms and obeyed by the relevant
members of the society; a generalized system of abstract rules having the
qualities of logic and consistency; finally, obedience, which is based on
membership of the society and not owed to the individual ruler. 3' To
Weber, there is comparatively less arbitrariness, dictation, abuse and
uncertainty in the rational legal system. Law is therefore important in
establishing order and promoting predictability, as the will of the
individual is replaced by the collective aspiration of the people.
In some circles, Weber is seen as the first social scientist to have
articulated the indispensable role of law for economic and social
development. Notwithstanding the fact that the Weberian analyses have
been nuanced into social and economic imperatives, its articulation of law
as a basis for development is akin to the formalism expressed by the legal
positivists. The pristine function of legal formalism, however, is evidenced
by the writing of legal thinkers such as Austin and Kelsen.39
It is also this conceptual origin of the Weberian position that offers one
of the most patent criticisms of legal rationality. Formalism in this
circumstance does not admit of measures to address substantive
developmental issues. For example, privileged classes who had control
over property and even over fellow human beings would rely on formal
law to entrench and protect their positions. Therefore, interpreting the law
to redirect resources to exploited or depressed areas such as Chiapas in
Mexico or extension of electric power to economically unattractive areas
may not be possible. It can be argued that the Weberian emphasis is on
process and that the formal law is identified by established characteristics
of its promulgation. To that end, the substance of the law could be to
reallocate resources, except that it 'must be done formally. The
contradiction here is that the law protects and reorders the status quo
concurrently. It freezes development while it can also revamp it. The
rationalized formal law also enacts unquestioning obedience, at least as to
substance, and allows little room for discretion. For, if questioning of
substance and discretion is permitted in the application of the law, it would
undermine the benefits of certainty, detachability and predictability.

38. Id.
39. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (I. Berlin & S.
Hampshire eds., 1832); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (1989); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW (1994).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/2
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2. Bureaucracy'
For formal rationality to operate effectively, there must be in place a
specialized administrative staff to process the mechanics involved. That
administrative apparatus is what is described as bureaucracy. The principal

characteristic of the Weberian bureaucracy is the abstract regularity with
which authoritative edicts must be executed."' That is, it must ensure the
inherent guarantee of reliable formal expectations ofthe political authority
without becoming integrated or identified with the politicians.42 The
bureaucracy is formally charged with the husbandry of the interests of the
state or community but within clearly defined legal limits. There must be
a clear legal foundation for the civil service. That law must be based on the
ultimate validity of the entire legal order.43 The reason is that recognition
and appreciation of the validity of the legal order facilitates the
acceptability, compliance and enforceability of legal prescriptions-by the
government.
The power of the bureaucrat is attached to the legal office and not to
the individual. Public monies must be distanced from private property of
the official, executive office removed from the household, and business
from private fortunes. This is one major distinction between the rational
legal bureaucracy and patrimonial or neo-patrimonial administrative
systems that tend to exist in many less industrialized countries." Loyalty
in a modem bureaucracy is impersonal and the units are functionally
oriented. The bureaucrat's sense of duty must take priority over his
personal views and his ability to do this well is ideally a part of his
professional ethic. 5 This is why the bureaucrat must be well trained to
function in technically relevant roles.' The more specialized the subject,
the more the need for the professional to serve as a bureaucrat. The
emphasis on the pristine distinction between official and private matters
is to avoid the possibility of confusing and sacrificing the larger
expectations of the society for the private interests of the individual. This

40. Effective bureaucracy is taken to be an element of good governance and its discussion
here would preclude further argument at the third section of this chapter concerning the elements
of good governance.
41. See PAUL CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 398 (1994).
42. But civil servants, in reality, wield enormous political power. See EDWARD C. PAGE,
POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND BUREAUCRATIC PowER 1-3 (1985).
43. WEBER,supra note 28, at 31.
44. See Trebilcock, supra note 24, at 291 (discussing corruption and inefficiency in judicial
administration in Latin America). Corruption in the bureaucracies of Latin American countries is
attributed to its Spanish colonial heritage.
45. WEBER, supra note 28, at 456-58.
46. Id at 458-67.
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would not do for efficient and rational planning and execution of state
policy. "For modem bureaucracy, the element of calculability of its rules
has really been of decisive significance. The nature of modem civilization
especially its technical-economic substructure, requires this calculability
of consequences." 4

As the economy expanded and the role of the state for rapid
modernization became more prominent, the bureaucracy also magnified
and increasingly asserted control over economic activity. This was
accepted as necessary for social harmony especially in the light of the
internationalization of economic activity. Weber, however, cautioned
against extending the functions of the bureaucracy to cover economics."'
This is because he feared such an extension would engender state
socialism and constrain efficiency.49 More directly, since the bureaucracy
is a status group with an interest to seek and protect, giving it unchecked
powers over economic activity could sow the seeds of corruption.' ° He
also argued that although expansion of the bureaucracy is a common
feature of all civilizations, hydra-headed, assertive or unwieldy
bureaucracy can paralyze private economic activity.5
The Weberian model of bureaucracy is sound, viable and can be seen
as a function of modem capitalist economic development. Its merits
include coordination, consistency, speed, precision, records, objectivity,
secrecy and technical expertise. That ethic would be an essential
requirement for the inevitable regulation of an industry as technical as
energy with wide ranging national and international implications.52 It is,
however, amenable to two internal and external critiques. The model does
not indicate how the bureaucrats are to be recruited, trained, and the levels
of motivation offered. This is important if there should be no implication
of coercion or non-existence of choice. For, if that is the case, the
efficiency of the bureau cannot be guaranteed in the long term. Also, the
professional and routine bureaucracy may not admit initiative, discretion
and personal responsibility. Further, Weber does not explain how the
47. Weber, supra note 35, at 53.
48. WEBER, supra note 28, at LII-LHI.
49. Id.
50. Id. at LXXXVII; see also id at LXXXIV [where the editors, Roth and Wittich, postulate
that the bureaucrat (staff) "acts on the basis of habit, legitimacy and self-interest"].
5I. Id.atLll-LIII. He strenuously opposed nationalization ofmajor industries. Id.atXCVII.
52. In Russia, contradictory and uncoordinated bureaucracy hindered electricity development.
See JONATHAN COPPERSMITH, THE ELECTrICATION OF RussiA 1880-1926, at 11 (1992). Export
of gas from Bangladesh to India was fraught with difficulties due to inefficient bureaucracy, lack
of transparency and political interference. Robert Corzine & Mark Nicholson, Oilmen Fear
Bangladesh Politics May Cloud Development of NaturalGas Riches FIN. TRM Apr. 27,1998,
at 4.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/2
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bureaucracy contributed to the varying degrees of development of different
countries even within Western Europe. In other words, detached and
professional bureaucracy is important but is not the panacea or the linchpin
for development. Factors such as resource endowments, ideology,
motivating circumstances such as war and empire building, culture, and
religion are all crucial. All these were not lacking in the era in which
Weber lived and worked, and no doubt influenced his thinking.53
To conclude, it can be argued that Max Weber discerned the role of law
and the state apparatus for economic and social development. 5' His work
is interesting for its outline of the interlocking relationship between law
and development, and it is trailblazing in its detailed exposition of the
functioning of the bureaucracy. The major failing of the work is its
inability to descend into essentialism, at least, modestly, and its
uncompromising faith in formalism. Be that as it may, Weber helped lay
a foundation for the later emergence of the law and development
movement in the 1960s and ultimately, it would be argued, for the
contemporary discourse on Governance. A common feature of all three
phenomena -

Weber, Law and Development, and Good Governance

-

is the search for the proper role of the law, mainly via the state, for the
economic and social modernization of society.
B. The Law and Development Movement in the
Middle Twentieth Century
Law and Development as a discipline either for curricula, research or

as an agenda at all, was first articulated in the mid- 1960s with the passage
of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act and the institution of the

53. Otto Von Bismarck achieved unification of more than two hundred city-states into one
German state under Prussia in 1871. See BENDALL CoLLiNs, MAX WEBER: A SKELETON KEY 9-41
(1986). The consolidation and operation of the new state had gotten underway at the time when
Max Weber was a student of Law and later Political Economy. Jad It was also the period when
Weber began intense studies of the workings of the new state and its prospects. Id It was crucial
for the survival of the state to fashion a system that would hold the formerly independent states
together. Ia That required a strong centralized state and a unifying and universally desired goal.
Id The latter was found in industrialization. Jad These objectives had to be pursued with minimal
tolerance for sectional or regional interests. Hence the resort to, or the need for, breathless
formality. Id.; see also STEPHE TURNER & REGIS FACTOR, MAX WEBER: THE LAWYER AS A
SOCIAL THINKER 3-7 (1994). The Weberian period (1864-1920) saw Germany as the fastest
industrializing country in Europe. When he served as advisor to the Weimar Constitutional
Commission, his suggestion for strong Presidential powers was incorporated into the Constitution.
Id at 6.
54. For an insightful and succinct outline of Weber's thoughts on law and development and
its relationship to the work of modernists, see David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law:
An &sayon the Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 11-16 (1972).
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Administration of Justice Program." It has been defined as a "specialized
area of academic study... concerned with the relationship between the
legal systems and development"'1 with particular reference to the social,
political and economic transformation of the developing world." The
factors that contributed to the rise of the movement include the notion,
which gained currency at the time; of social engineering through law;
growing interest in law and society; post World War Two U.S.
commitment to foreign assistance as means of advancing American
security and economic interests; and the experience gained from colonial
administration.5 '

After the Second World War, it became increasingly untenable to hold
colonies or dependencies when the war was fought in part to liberate

people and territories under Nazi or fascist domination. The move towards
political independence of the then colonies was therefore irresistible. The
struggle for, and attainment of, independence itself engendered severe
controversies for economic development. On the one hand, there was the
argument for the need to maintain the status quo in its economic form and
to entrench it with law. 9 The second argument was for the need to
reorganize the post-colonial economy, and in the process, change or
renunciate legal principles like pacta sunt servanda that reinforce the
colonial underpinnings of the economy. Both arguments provided
sufficient basis for the examination of the relationship between law and
development.
Further to the foregoing, however, economists had started re-examining
economic principles for the development of the newly decolonized states.
It was at this time also that the discipline - Development Economics emerged.' That provided the platform for the proliferation of literature on
economic models that should speed up the development of the less
developed countries."' The Development Economists pursued two
questions: why is it that some countries are poor and others rich, and how
can poverty be alleviated? In explaining poverty, Nurkse, one of the most
influential writers in the field at the time, argued that the size of the market
limited the scope of expansion and also that low incomes lead to low
savings and low investment.' This is a self-perpetuating circle. Others like

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See Zagaris, supra note 32, at 123.
Id
Id
Id at 125.
See generally KILLICK, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, supranote i, at 11-29.
Id.
Id.

62. Id.
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Myrdal, Rostow, Leibenstein, Scitovsky and Lewis all pursued almost the
same line.63 They were also fairly unanimous in their prescription for
poverty alleviation. They suggested what has since become known as
structuralist or "Big Push" approach to development." To break the cycle
of underdevelopment, it is crucial that there be a decisive external
intervention. This could be in the form of substantial state involvement
directly in economic activity or massive foreign investment. Beyond the
projected macro economic benefits, such an intervention is necessary due
to the dearth of private indigenous capital and entrepreneurship in the
newly decolonised states."5 Intervention in that form, it was contended,
would also move the economy away from its colonial function of
supplying primary products and consumer of goods finished in the
industrial countries. Though there were some dissident voices, there was
consensus centered around the foregoing analysis.' That consensus, to a
large extent, provided an impetus for the delineation of the role of law.
Both in its diagnosis of poverty and in its prescription for solution,
development economics of the mid-twentieth century had much in

common with the main tenets of the law and development or
modernization movement.6'
C. Modernization Theory
The modernists accept the challenge of development and believe that
structures, concepts and mechanisms which have been developed in the

industrialized countries can be successfully adapted to the circumstances
of the less developed countries "in the hope of producing convergent
economic, social, and political development." 8 The movement which is
largely of American origin, blossomed in the 1960s and has since had an

undulating life.69 It started off in an investigative mode, then transformed
into a prescriptive and training project for law students from the
developing world. The entire program was encapsulated and consummated
in the 1966 U.S. Foreign Assistance Act. It provided for optimum local

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.

66. d
67. However, the two factors hardly worked together. See David Trubek, Law and

Development: Then andNow, 90 AiL SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW PROCEEDINGS 223, 223 (1996).
68. See David Greenberg, Law and Development in Light of Dependency Theory, in LAW
AND DEvELOPmENT,

supra note 32, at 90.

69. The modernist movement which started off as the U.S. government and U.S. based
private foundations, such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, sought non-communist ways
for modernizing the newly independent states of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Id.
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participation in the economic development of the developing countries by
means of support for democratic, private and local governmental
institutions.7 ° The central question was "which combinations of norms and
institutions would impede, and which could facilitate development.""'
A number of institutions were charged with the responsibility to
investigate these and related questions. They included the United States
Agency for International Development and the Center for International
Studies at New York University.' The latter body had the task of
examining the feasibility ofrealizing or implementing the objectives of the
Act as far as law was concerned. 73 Teams were sent to selected countries
to examine the relationship between legal institutions and the processes of
development. They were also to investigate the possibility of adapting the
technique and experience of American institutions, lawyers and laworiented private and public bodies to assist in the development effort.74 It
was also at this time that a number of western, and to some extent, eastern
countries started establishing agencies for co-operation and international
development with the aim of accelerating the rate of development of the
poor countries." The assistance towards modernizing the newly
independent states was, at least initially, at the behest of the industrialized
states with no apparent conditions.76
The modernization theory postulates that all nation states go through
three stages of development." These are unification of smaller units into
a nation, the pursuit of industrialization as an economic goal, and the
institution of welfare mechanisms to handle the fall-out from the
industrialization process. 7 If this was the case with the industrialized
countries, it would be the same for the former colonies. However, the
process in the newly independent states can be hastened by help from the
more experienced industrialized states." In unifying smaller components
70. 22 U.S.C. § 2218 (1970).
71. DAVID E. APTE, RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY, AND
POSThODERN POLITICS 13 (1987).
72. See Franck, supra note 29, at 767.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Some see these agencies as means of advancing super powers' ideological and other
interests. See Hunter R. Clark, African Renaissance and US. Trade Policy, 27 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 265, 274 n.38 (1999).
76. See generally A.F.K. ORGANSKI, THE STAGES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1965).
77. See generally Tariq Banuri, Development and The Politics of Knowledge: A Critical
Interpretationofthe SocialRole ofModernization Theories in the Development ofthe Third World,
in FREDERIQUE APFEL & STEPHEN A. MARGLIN, DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE (1990); see also
Franck, supra note 29, at 770-78.
78. See generally, Banuri supranote 77; see also Franck, supra note 29, at 770-78.
79. Franck supra note 29, at 770-78.
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into a nation state as well as in developing the political market,' lawyers
adept at or inclined to constitutional law and process, would be needed to
guide, direct or translate the political or social process into law. In brief,
consistent with Weberian thinking, stability and legitimacy are inherent in
the pursuit of unification. The law is also important in the industrialization
process. Industrialization implies investment from private or public
sources. Due to the inadequacy of local capital, most private investment
in the developing world is from industrialized countries. Apart from a
conducive political and constitutional environment, there is the need for
appropriate legal framework for attracting and sustaining investment.
Issues such as taxation, expropriation, profit repatriation, planning and
environmental regulation have to be addressed and this is a proper domain
for the law and lawyers. The final stage of modernization equally requires
the legal profession. Drawing on constitutional provisions on civil liberties
and rights, lawyers develop legal principles for protecting the factory floor
worker, environmental protection, housing, health care, etc. Law, located
in an appropriate legal culture, with its quality of consistency and stability,
can operate to legitimize and manage these potentially destabilizing
transitions in ways that would give, at least, an appearance of order and
tranquility.
The task of development, in the modernist thought, requires new kinds
of law and a "new" kind of lawyer and more rigorous legal institutions.
Customary law was regarded as too lethargic, unpredictable, localized and
inflexible to develop new laws and norms crucial for development."' The
replacement of traditional pluralistic legal institutions by a centralized
monolithic legal system could facilitate unification and consolidation of
a nation, weaken conservative old-fashioned traditional elites who obstruct
modernization, and foster political democracy. The law that relates to
political participation has to be participatory and not merely
representative. It has to create multiple avenues for redress, competition
and challenge. The law governing business activity must be transparent
and in tandem with practices elsewhere. It is important to have
institutional or procedural alternatives to the existing formal structures of
mainly vertical representation. Judicial and quasi-judicial bodies such as
tax courts, ombudsman, legal aid or public defender scheme, trade and
other commissions would facilitate both constitutional and commercial
growth. There is need for lawyers who are experts in particular fields, but

80. APTERsupra note 71, at24.
81. Customary law is defined in Article 11(3) of the 1992 Ghana Constitution as "the rules
of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana." See GHANA CONST.
of 1992, art. 11(3), in CONSTITTIONS OF THE COUNIES OF THE WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz eds.,
Oceana Pubs. Vol. VII 1998).
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since law is not inherently developmental it is also important to have
lawyers with broad-based and interdisciplinary knowledge.' Hence the
training of judges and lawyers to use newly enacted codes, and in a

departure from Weberian thought, to take a more functional or
instrumentalist approach to the law and be less formalistic.8 3
Notwithstanding its inspirational message, the modernization theory
has been criticized as being breathlessly optimistic." It is unable to explain
upheavals such as the Nazi war in Europe, genocidal revolts as in BosniaHerzegovina, Rwanda and Cambodia. If it had more interest in historical
dialectics, it would have contextualised the stages of development, the role
of law and what has to be done at each stage. The faith in the role of law
in development is undermined by the fact that countries in Latin America
who since the nineteenth century had constitutions based on the U.S.
model, and civil codes derived from the French Code lagged in their
development. While the modernists focused on the guiding hand of the law
in promoting development, they did not consider the impact of non-legal
factors on development generally nor legal development in particular.
These omissions have been blamed for' the failure of the optimistic
expectations of the modernists."5
Another factor that explains the failure of the modernization theory is
the contradiction inherent in the theory. On the one hand, it calls for
transparency, facilitation ofpublic participation in political institutions and
the protection of citizens against governmental arbitrariness and abuse of
human rights. At the same time, the theory is contemptuous of traditional
or customary institutions and would like to see the influence of traditional
elites weakened. A result of this contradiction is seen in the rise of
totalitarian regimes between 1965 and 1990 in Brazil, Uganda, Chile,
Congo, Zambia, Ethiopia and others. 6 Three problems emerge from the
82. See generally Franck, supra note 29, at 777-800.
83. See id. at 788.
84. Trubek, supra note 54.

85. See Greenberg, supra note 68, at 94. Banuri points to other factors including the Vietnam
War, OPEC and the energy crisis of the 1970s, Watergate, prolonged depression in the West, and
revelations of Stalinist excesses. See Banuri, supra note 77, at 30-32. The central thrust of the
modernists was action-oriented, and not inquiry. To that end, they had little theoretical interests and
almost no interests in learning about or from other cultures. No consistent and encapsulating theory
has been formulated and tested; and in the process they "suffered from an unfamiliarity with the
target culture[s] and societ[ies] (including [their] legal system[s]), lack of theory, artificially
privileged access to power, and relative immunity to consequences." Zagaris, supra note 32, at 127.
This is why it would be important to locate models of energy reform within the relevant national
or regional contexts. See Mike Parker, General Conclusions and Lessons, in BRmTSH ELECRicrrY
EXPERIME4TPRIVATISATION: THE RECORD, THE IssUEs, THE LESSONS 304 (John Surrey ed., 1996).
86. Some of these countries were targets of the initial modernization efforts. See Franck,
supra note 29, at 768.
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foregoing analyses. One is the tension between a strong centralized
government and the imperative of decentralization of public institutions
and functions. Second, the possible unease between law as a protector of
civil rights and a technocratic instrumentalist conception of law. Finally,
the tension between enthusiastic promotion of foreign investment and the
power and influence of multinational corporations by themselves and
governments. Some of these corporations such as Kaiser Aluminum, have
their own Form Contracts which serve as the model of their agreements
with developing countries. This is hardly surprising in view of the limited
administrative capacity of developing countries."'

These problems can be described as the internal causes of the decline
of the modernization theory and the entire Law and Development
movement in the 1980s. There were other reasons that were exogenous to
the movement which also hastened its decline in the 1990s. The single
most important external factor was the end of the Cold War and the demise
of Stalinist-Leninist Communism.8" There is little doubt that the reaction
of the dependencists against the modernists had left-wing undertones."
The modernization theory itself was embedded in neo-liberal or capitalist
philosophy of economic and political development. Beyond that, the
modernization project largely emerged as an American way of entrenching
capitalism, systems of government supportive of the West and repelling of
communist hegemony. The American modernists derived legal basis and
support from Acts of Congress and State department programs. They also
received funding from the U.S. government and private foundations based
in the U.S., all in the fight against communism.' With the fall of
communism therefore, the incentive for modernization as originally
conceived has been removed. Further, the West does not need to persuade
any country or government to think western anymore. Modernization as
operated in the 1960s and the 1970s was thus moribund or comatose. This
work contends, however, that the modernization ideas reappeared in the
1990s in the form of good governance discourse, but with significant
differences.
Although the substance of governance may not be difficult to identify
and fairly indistinguishable irrespective of the perspective taken, there are
discernible differences between the discourse of governance as advanced
by the modernists on the one hand, and international development
institutions on the other. The first is terminology. The Modernists, or Law
87. See Greenberg, supra note 68, at 768.
88. This can also be described as a crucial landmark in the rebirth of the law and
development movement See Trubek, supra note 54, at 223-26.
89. See Banuri, supra note 77; see also APTER, supra note 71, at 9.

90. See Zagaris,supra note 32; see also Greenberg, supra note 68.
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and Development theorists, notwithstanding occasional references and use,
laid no emphasis on the term "governance." More clearly, the Law and
Development practitioners did not characterize or emasculate their ideas
and work under "Good Governance." This may be because the patently
political character of governance would have invited vociferous responses
in the then cold war environment and stultify the prosecution of the
project. Good Governance is a terminology that is largely popularized by
the international development institutions.
The second point of departure between the modernists and the
international development institutions is the sponsorship and management
of the governance project. In the 1960s and the mid-1980s, the law and

development program was sponsored directly by the United States mainly
through the Agency for International Development and the State
Department. 9' The participants and managers of the program were mainly
drawn from American institutions. 92 In the contemporary governance
program, however, the sponsors are mainly multilateral development
institutions like the INM, 9' the World Bank, the United Nations
Development Program, 94 The Asian Development Bank, 9 African
Development Bank,96 as well as development agencies in individual
countries of the west." The managers of the program are also drawn from

these institutions or hired by them. It can be argued, however, that to the
extent that the multilateral institutions are largely funded and controlled

91. Greenberg, supranote 68, at 90; Zagaris, supranote 32, at 124-25, 133-35, and 163-64.
In fact, the U.S. Congress provided expressly for this support in the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961. It was also supported by U.S. based foundations such as the Ford and Rockefeller
Foundations.
92. For example, Thomas Franck, a Professor of Law at New York University was the head
of a team that toured a number of countries on the modernization mission. See Franck, supra note
29, at 767-69.
93. See IMF, supra note 16.
94. See Governance for Sustainable Development, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM (1997).
95. See Shoji Nishimoto, The Bank's Governance Policy, in ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
(ADB), GOVERNANCE: PROMOTING SOUND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT 9-11 (Record of
Proceedings of a Seminar in Fukuoka, Japan, May 1997); Barry Metzger, Law and Development:
An E&sential Dimension of Governance, in ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), GOVERNANCE:
PROMOTING SOUND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT 15-19 (Record of Proceedings of a Seminar in
Fukuoka, Japan, May 1997).
96. See generally AFUCAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN
AFRICA: ISSUES AND THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND OTHER MULTILATERAL

ORGANIZATIONS (1993).
97. The Carter Center at Emory University has also been recognized for playing a pioneering
role in the focus on governance. See HYDEN, supra note 7, at 6.
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by the rich countries, they can be said to be the indirect sponsors of the
governance project.
Another important difference between what in essence are two phases
of the governance project, lies in the style adopted by the two sides. To a
large extent, both were not very interested in critical inquiry or research.
Neither were they keen on learning from their subjects. They agreed on the
diagnosis of the cause or reason for the underdevelopment and were ready
with the governance prescription. However, in administering the project,
the modernists showed, at least in language, some respect for the views of
their subjects and were prepared to "negotiate" with them. As Franck put
it:
Oversensitivity and overfastidiousness in this respect may be
no more helpful to Africa and Asia than was the earlier phase
of insensitivity and condescending paternalism. What is
needed is help given and taken, with mutual respect, without
strings, to promising projects, backed by responsible
individuals and institutions in recipient states."'
On the other hand, the multilateral institutions and the advocates of good
governance in the 1990s do not appear willing to persuade their clients.
Some of the advocates would even go as far as to suggest auditing and
sanctioning poor countries which are not in tune with the good governance
line."
Finally, international development institutions, particularly the IMF
and the World Bank, show some sensitivity to the letter of their founding
instruments in their pursuit of good governance. To this end, they prefer
to emphasize the economic aspects of good governance. In analyzing
governance, the World Bank draws a clear distinction between the
concept's political and economic dimensions. The World Bank's mandate
is the promotion of sustainable economic and social development. The
World Bank's Articles of Agreement explicitly prohibit the institution
from interfering in a country's internal political affairs and require it to
take only economic considerations into account in its decisions. Thus, the
World Bank's call for good governance and its concern with
accountability, transparency, and the rule of law have to do exclusively
with the contribution they make to social and economic development and
to the World Bank's fundamental objective of sustainable poverty
reduction in the developing world.'0°

98. See Franck, supra note 29, at 770.
99. See generally McAuslan, supra note 23.
100. See WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at vii.
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The modernists on the other hand did not show any such preference.
Given the cold war context in which they operated, the modernists leaned
on the adoption of western political institutions.' It was, therefore, not
surprising that the modernization work drew a response, or at the very
least, encouraged the growth of the dependency movement which was of
left-wing persuasion."°
All these differences and similarities 0 3 between the modernization and
good governance projects are very important for the implementation or
working of the idea in the lives of the developing country subjects. For one
thing, the involvement of the international development institutions means
that the orientation of the program is more practical than academic." It
also means that there would be more interest in specific sectors of a
subject country's economy as for example in the drive for the deregulation
of the energy sector.'O At a general level, the metamorphosis of the ideals
of effective functioning of government and its relationship to economic
development point to its inexorable indispensability. The status and
implications of good governance for both its practice and sophisticated
academic discourse would be significantly impacted by a characterization
of good governance as a principle, concept, policy or rule.
V. GOOD GOVERNANCE AS A PRINCIPLE

Whatever its origin, the idea of governance has not been consistently
formulated or described in a way that could assure both rhetorical and
substantive coherence. It has variously been mentioned as a principle,
concept and policy."°6 It appears an issue, if any, regarding the theoretical

101. See Franck, supranote 29, at 767-69.
102. See Banuri, supra note 77, at 49.

103. The similarities include the fact that the substance of modernism and good governance
are largely the same: democracy, rule of law, transparency, civil society. They focus on the same
targets: developing countries, except that in the 1990s, Eastern and Central European Countries are
also subjects of governance work; they use western systems as models.
104. It has been suggested that as of 1998, there were over fifty publications by the World
Bank on privatization alone. See Jacques Girod & Jacques Percebois, Reforms in SubSaharan
Africa's Power Industries,26 ENERGY POL'Y 21, 21 (1998).

105. See id Apart from emphasizing that the World Bank is the leader in the reforms, the two
authors argue that the near total dependence on foreign financial sources by African countries
strengthens the latitude ofrecommendations put forward by the international financial organizations
concerning the necessity of reform. See id at 24.
106. Ruth Richardson describes the substance of good governance as "principles." See Ruth
Richardson, Governance: Promoting Sound Development in ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra
note 95, at 33. Okoth-Ogendo calls governance a concept. See H. Okoth-Ogendo, Governance and
SustainableDevelopment in Africa, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 107. See
Tolentino, supra note 10, at 137. Shoji Nishimoto refers to it as "policy." See Shoji Nishimoto,
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status of governance has been taken for granted. For, nowhere in the
existing literature has an issue been taken as to the consequences of
characterizing governance as a principle, concept or policy.' °7 Such a
clarification is important for two reasons. First, as noted, governance is
now being heralded as an emerging international law issue in a manner
that could take the shape of an erga omnes obligation.' Second, the
legitimacy of good governance claims and procedures such as
democratization, decentralization, liberalization, accountability need to be
explained to and accepted by the relevant constituency. The achievement
of these objectives would, at least, be facilitated by a clarification of
governance as a principle, policy or a concept. The strength of the idea, it
is contended, is enhanced or weakened by its classification and
characterization. This part of the work explores that angle of the discourse
and suggests that for its long-term endurance, at least a tentative
understanding of governance as a principle would be helpful. Such a
characterization would also facilitate a clearer discernment of the
derivatives of governance, its practical working as well as an exposition
of latent or inherent difficulties.
Black's Law Dictionary defines principle as "a fundamental truth or
doctrine as of law."'" If it is a fundamental truth or doctrine, principle can
hardly be distanced from normative values that may inhere in its practice.
At the same time, it might not admit of flexibility or variety in its content.
From that perspective, principle may appear to be a rigid, time-resistant
position. However, if principle is a "comprehensive rule or doctrine which
furnishes a basis or origin for others,""0 then it makes room for
derivatives. Such offshoots may be malleable and could develop in tandem
with time and societal development. It is, however, not clear yet what the
ideas derived from a principle would be and how they would relate to each
other. This is especially troubling where principle is said to denote a
general guiding rule whose directions could be determined by the relevant
subject matter."' Does it mean then that governance can be directed to
Opening Remarks, in ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 95, at 7.
107. See Philippe Sands, International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development:
Emerging Legal Principles, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 54

(Winfried Lang ed., 1995). Sands asks a similar question and posits that "principles can have a
range of practical consequences." Id at 56.
108. See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 83-84.
109. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1193 (6th ed.1990).
110. See id.

111. See McGreagh v. Fearson, (1922) 91(2) L.J.R. 365, 366 (Shearman, J.); see also
STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY 2044 (6th ed. 2000); TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 38 (1994). Cf. Stephen Krasner, StructuralCauses and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 2 (STEPHEN
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promote the development and management of energy resources? It is clear
nonetheless that a principle connotes a standard to be observed in pursuit
of a desirable state of affairs as may be required by a higher raison
d'etre."2 This would be the case for the efficient and equitable exploitation
of energy resources and the general development of a country.
"In a legal sense principles are juridical generalities,""! 3 which require
more specific normative rules and procedures to operate. Thus by their
hollow nature, principles may function to assemble or intermediate
conflicting ideas including those derived from the particular principle such
as the pursuit of efficiency and equity concurrently in resource
development. Secondly, principles generate and provide validity to norms
which operationalise them. To that end, an idea derived from a principle
4
cannot be divorced from or be inconsistent with the principle itself."
Finally, considering the contingent nature of the operational rules in the
dynamics of societal development, "principles - to the extent that they
are foundational - define the core personality or identity of the normative
superstructure applicable' to the activity they" govern. Principle also
gives credence to rules. That is, rules may be traced ultimately to
principles. Principles need rules to operate and at the same time provides
the rationale for the rule. For example, the rule that contracts for the
construction of power plants must be on open tender can be traced to the
principle of good governance requiring transparency. In that case, good
governance is the principle calling for a policy of transparency which is
manifested in the rule of open tender. At the same time, the idea of good
governance also requires that businesses, including the award of contracts,
must be seen to be transparent. It is therefore the function of principle to
preside over the relative strengths of rules when two or more rules conflict.
If the rule of open tender conflicts with the use of discretionary powers by
the Minister, the principle of good governance would anchor the resolution
of the conflict in each such circumstance." 6 Governance as a principle
KRASNER ed., 1983). Krasner speaks of principles as "beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude." See
id. This might accord with the general view that bad governance is cause of underdevelopment and
good governance is a necessary factor in the rectification ofunderdevelopment. See Okoth-Ogendo,
supra note 106, at 107-10; see also McAuslan, supranote 23, at 168.
112. See David Dzidzomu, Four Principles in Marine Environment Protection: A
ComparativeAnalysis, 29 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 91, 93 (1998).
113. See id.
114. This is akin to the Kelsenite postulates on legal theory particularly relating to the
Grundnonn and other norms. See R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 361-63 (1985). Another effective
analogy is Chief Justice Marshall's rationalization of the basis forjudicial review of legislation in
the United States. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 137 (1803).
115. See Dzidzornu, supra note 112, at 94.
116. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 27-28; see also D.J. GALLIGAN,
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could only incline a decision or policy one way or the other. Principles on
their own do not necessarily determine results. Rules perform that unique
function.""
A result that is at variance with the originating principle would imply
that the rule has been amended or abandoned but not necessarily the
principle. This is because the survival of principles is not conditioned on
whether they prevail or not." 8 Herein lies a support for an argument that
good governance as a principle does no harm and if it does not lead to
rapid development in any particular case, would not devalue or erode its
authenticity, significance or endurance. The fact that India, for example,
is not as industrially advanced as Japan does not assail the fact that good
governance is a vital principle of societal management and development."I9
This also gives reason for caution in the euphoric enthusiasm in the
propagation of bad governance as the cause for underdevelopment and
good governance as a panacea for underdevelopment.
In all these, nothing is said as to the origin of principle nor the
relationship between one principle and another. For, if principle gives rise
to varied ideas, it is important to hint at the deferential or hierarchical
order of the ideas originating from it. Failing that, it might be difficult to
reconcile the possible contradictions between formal requirements of rule
of law and the necessity for discretionary powers. First though, it is
important to assert the terminological quality of the ideas derived from a
principle. Would it be appropriate to call such ideas concepts?
Concept is something conceived or a general notion. It is also the
formation of a plan, or thought. 20 It might thus be easier to discern the
origin of a concept than a principle. It is possible that a concept may owe
its origin to a principle.' 2 ' This is because the process of concretizing a
principle, which is general, inevitably entails the employment or formation
of concepts. 22 For one thing, the conceptual analyses would help establish

56 (1986).
117. See DWORKIN, supra note 116, at 35.
118. See id.
119. India and Japan are cited primarily because India became an independent country in 1947
and Japan began a process of reconstruction after the Second World War. Though they have both
practiced pluralistic democracy (a significant element of good governance), Japan is an
industrialized country while India is considered a third world country.
DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL DIsCRETION

120. See CHAMBERS TWENTIEfh CENTURY DICTIONARY 269 (1972).
121. Principle may provide the conditions necessary and sufficient for the proper use of
concepts. See MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 92

(Joseph Bronzino et. al. eds. (1990)) [hereinafter MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY].
122. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 70-71 (1986). Concepts in that circumstance
perform an interpretive function. See id Dworkin's distinction of concept and conception would
mean for our purposes, a connection of concept (the branch) to principle (the trunk). See id
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the completeness and precision of the concepts themselves and the critical
environment in which they operate.' 23 This is because "abstract principles
...must be developed conceptually and shaped normatively to connect with
concrete action-guides and practical judgments."' 24 It may therefore be
argued that, in the event of a conflict or in a hierarchical arrangement,
principle might hold priority over concepts. To that end, governance may
be described as a principle which engenders the emergence, or need the
operational qualities of concepts like democracy, rule of law,
decentralization, discretion, equity and efficiency.
Governance is a term which may have varied meanings and flexible
application. It is a general principle or standard which may require flexible
interpretation and application in various circumstances. In that application,
it would be necessary to resort to concepts and rules. In other words,
governance is hollow and needs content. The content when ascertained,
cannot be said to override the mother agency. This is another reason why
it is not inappropriate to describe governance as a principle. Though it is
a word,12 governance is not a concept mainly because, in its general
orientation and when divorced from its contemporary value-laden
implications, good governance is self-evidently necessary that it is a
principiorum non est ratio.
Nor is it a policy. Policy connotes a tentativeness that may at best
originate from a principle. 6 Principle as already noted, is general, abstract
and in the nature of a standard whose realization requires policy as an
instrument. Decentralization for example, may be a policy that originates
from good governance. Policy can handle peculiarities without doing
violence to principle. The principle to electrify an entire country would not
be subverted by a priority attention to most economically viable or most
depressing regions. Furthermore, policy connotes a result from
deliberations by a superior agency. Although the language of good
governance is dominated by paternalistic and ethnocentric patrons in
industrialized countries, international development institutions and
123. See MEDICAL TEcOLOGY, supra note 121, at 94.
124. BEAUCHAMP, supra note I11l, at 38.

125. Good governance is also considered a phrase by some.
126. But Cf Dzidzomu, supra note 112, at 104. Speaking in terms of marine environment
protection, Dzidzornu sees policy as parallel to principle in some respects, but concludes that policy
is superior to principle because policy is more general. See id As far as the comparison is between
the two, a reversed conclusion is more logical and reasonable. See id Principle is abstract and needs
the practical quality of policy to operate. See id Goran Hyden also argues that governance and
policy making are separate entities but in practice often affect each other. See HYDEN, supra note
7, at 7. The main difference, he contends "is that governance deals with 'metapolicies'." See id.
This accords with our general position that governance as a principle is of a higher order than the
policies derived from it. See id
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academia, the need for it, even if varied and contested, is appreciated by
the subject countries and other stake holders. 2 " In other words,
notwithstanding its external influences, good governance is also inherently
internal, or at least, has a significant domestic constituency and relevance.
For that reason, it would not be accurate to describe it as a policy. To say
so would invite the question whose policy? The theoretical
relationships among the ideas derived from good governance can be
illustrated as follows:

127. This may be deduced from the general upheavals against totalitarian rule in the former
Eastern Europe, Ethiopia, Zaire, and the referenda in favor of constitutional democracy in Ghana,
Malawi, Zambia and others. See Michael Bratton & Nicolas Van De Walle, TowardGovernance
inAfrka: PopularDemands andStateResponses, inGOVERNANCEANDPOLMCSINAFRICA, supra
note 7, at 27-54. It might be added that low voter turn-out in general elections in countries like
Britain and United States of America does not necessarily mean a rejection of the political systems
in those countries. See ANTHONY BiRCH, THE CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY
81 (1993).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

27

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Florida Journal ofFLORIDA
International
Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2

[Vol. 13

Figure 1. Venn diagram showing the relationship between
Principle, Concept, Policy and Rule.
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Figure 2. Venn diagram showing Principle and its
derivatives.
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Figure 3. Venn diagram showing good governance and its derivatives.
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In sum therefore, good governance is a principle because it has an
enduring feature. It is also general and all-embracing as to cover not only
macro management of a society but also micro management of economic
sectors including energy, international relations and trade. Further, good
governance needs norms and ideas to concretize and enrich it. It is argued
subsequently that subjects such as democracy, rule of law, decentralization
and discretion perform the filling function. The rest of the article discusses
these as elements of good governance. The discussion of these specifics
would expose the problems, contradictions, as well as strengths inherent
in their composite application. It would also highlight their relevance and
application for the stable, efficient and equitable exploitation, management
and trade in energy resources.
A. Democracy
This section focuses on democracy at three levels. First, the place of
democracy as a constituent element of good governance; second, the
meaning of democracy for economic development; and third, democratic
governance as a bedrock for the stability and legitimacy ofthe national and
international political system. The principal argument therefore is that
democracy in all its forms is essential for stable and legitimate polity. A
brief overview of the concept of democracy may be in order.
The origin of the concept and practice of democracy is a subject of
controversy among theorists and practitioners of the social sciences. Some
argue that it is inherent to the nature of human beings, while others
contend that it requires conscious effort by a group of people to forge a
democratic ethic.' 28 Although processes such as elections are essential,
that, simpliciter, would not guarantee the durability of the legitimacy so
conferred. It is for that reason that the tangible manifestations of the
benefits of the processes, such as equitable economic development, would
be necessary. This is because dire economic conditions can create
conditions conducive for the emergence of a populist autocrat. 29 The
position taken here therefore is a median one. Processes and economic
development must move in tandem. The pursuit of democracy and its
progress must be based on processes such as elections, institutions,
dialogue as well as the promotion and realization of improvement in the

128. See GEOFF HODGSON, THE DEMOCRATIC ECONOMY: A NEW LOOK AT PLANNING,
MARKETS, AND POWER 17 (1984); see also CLARK NEHER & Ross MARLAY, DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT INSouTH EAST ASIA: THE WINDS OF CHANGE xii-xiv, 1-10 (1995).
129. Niskannen argued that a government that served only the interests of the majority is
neiher desirable nor stable. See HODGSON, supra note 128, at 35.
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material conditions of the people.' 30 The two in essence amount to
participation. 31 In other words, the binary positions that see either as
antithetic to the other or tangential, is devalued. 32 The most important
segment inthe democratic process is the holding of free and fair elections
33
for local, regional and national leadership at predetermined periods.
Though "town hall" assemblies can be organized and may be useful as fora
for deliberations on matters affecting a community, 3" the growing size and
cosmopolitan nature of human societies in the twentieth century and
beyond, makes "town hall" or direct democracy unrealistic and
unsatisfactory.' 3 The election of representatives therefore remains the
more viable means of conferring legitimacy on the rulers and also enabling
some participation of the people in their governance.' 3 ' The comparative
merits of the exact form of the election process, for example proportional
representation, first past the post, is not the primary concern here. 37 What
is important is that people have a meaningful participation in the election
of their representatives. In that case, they may be able to elect
representatives who reflect their ideals and concerns. 3 ' This requires the
removal of tangible and latent obstacles to the emergence of candidates.
Requirements based on wealth, ethnicity, education, sex, religion and

130. See generally JOHN D. MAY, OF THE CONDITIONS AND MEASURE OF DEMOCRACY 1-27;
AFTER, supra note 71, at 7.
131. See id.
132. Rhoda Howard outlines the argument proffered by some dictators for economic
development before democracy. See Trebilcock, supra note 24, at 20-25 (for a synthesis of the
debate).
133. See HELD, supra note 26, at 166.
134. This is what Max Weber described as "direct democracy." See ROTH,supra note 28, at
LXXXV; see also KOFI A. BUsIA, THE POSmON OF THE CHIEF INMODERN ASHANTI POLmCAL
SYSTEM XII(1958); JOHN MCALISTER JR, SOUTH EAST ASIA: THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL
INTEGRATION 252 (1975). McAlister asserts that majority of South-East Asians lived in villages.
See id. This would not be the case after three decades.
135. See MCALISTER, supra note 134, at 252, describing it as inherently unstable.
136. See Nancy Bermeo, Civil Society, GoodGovernmentandNeo-LiberalReforms, in GOOD
GOVERNMENT AND LAW 83-4 (Julio Faundez ed. 1997); see also HELD, infra note 174, at 166.
137. See generally ALISTAIR COLE & PETER CAMPBELL, FRENCH ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND

ELECTIONS SINCE 1789 (1989) (For a discussion of electoral systems). EUROPEAN ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK (Geoffrey Hand, et al., eds. 1979).
138. The hypothesis that politicians reflect the concerns of their constituents is a controversial
one. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). In this
instance, it might be difficult for a local representative not to respond to the concerns of the
community affected by a resource project. See id. Admittedly, a national leader has to respond to
diverse interests and in the circumstances, may "sacrifice" interests that fetch lower political gains
for those with higher political premium. See id The issue of political self-interest environmental
protection has been raised in the U.S. See Michael Lyons, Political Self-Interest and US.
EnvironmentalPolicy, 39 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 271, 271-94 (1999).
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publicity can frustrate the emergence of competent candidates and thereby
limit the options available to the electorate.
Although the election of candidates based on their own merit has been
experimented within different countries,' 39 the party mechanism with
ongoing innovations remains the most realistic, effective and inevitable
institution for the election of governors. Electors would invariably line up
behind a candidate with the most favorable program and if that pattern
persists for sometime, groups coalesce around the candidates and their
programs and partisan politics is the unavoidable result. Admittedly, the
elected representative may deviate from the platform on which he or she
was elected or may be "forced" to go with the party line or constrained by
special interest even where that position is unacceptable or inimical to the
interests of his or her constituency. This can affect the faith of the electors
in their representative and the viability of the entire system. Some
consolence can be taken in the fact that future election dates are certain
and there is the opportunity to change the representative at the next
election or provisions exist for recalling him or her.
It means that the electorate must be alert to its interests and the
imperative of democratic ethos. They must be very well informed and
develop reasonably independent thought processes.' 4° To facilitate this,
mass media facilities must be available in a fair manner to all candidates
as well as to opinion leaders of communities. This would help promote a
two-way communication between candidates and electorate. The highpoint of the communication process must be located within the specific
social and cultural context of the people concerned.' 4' It is also important
for the electorate to realize that their representative is one among many
and also the national leader is to respond to the needs of all. This
consciousness would moderate the expectations of the voters and preserve
the legitimacy and stability of the system.
The moderation of expectations would largely depend on an
understanding of economic development and its relationship to social and
political issues. Indeed, the legitimacy conferred on the government by the
electoral processes would not be finn or durable ifthe economic and social
139. District or local level elections in Ghana are required under the Constitution to be held
on a no-party basis. See GHANA CONST. art. 248 (1992), in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE CoUN'rRIEs OF
THE WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz eds.; Oceana Pubs. Vol. VII 1996). Uganda under Yoweri Museveni

operates "No Party" system of elections and government See Quentin Peel, Seeds ofStability, FIN.
TIMs, Jan. 27, 1997, at 16. In Ghana, the Rawlings regime which preferred the no party elections

is accused of operating a defacto party system at the local level.
140. APTER, supra note 71, at 30.
141. In certain communities, there are specified dates when activities such as farming, fishing
or mining are not permitted. In other words, those dates may be considered vacation periods and
that may have to be taken into account in mass education programs.
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aspirations of the people are ignored. In countries like Ghana, Sierra
Leone, Nigeria and Chile, democratically elected governments were
overthrown by military adventurists when it was thought that the elected
governments were not dealing with economic problems with alacrity. 42
Beyond the subversion of the government at the national level, inadequate
attention to economic needs generally and the particular needs of a region
or community can create fertile grounds for secessionist tendencies. 43
Economic demands have been cited in the secessionist drives in the Niger
Delta-Nigeria, Aceh-Indonesia, and Southern Sudan.'"
It has been argued that liberal democratic ethos like freedom of speech,
press, elections, and political pluralism, are irrelevant to a person who has
no food, clothing and shelter, or that such freedoms must come in the wake
of development. 45 In the words of a former Ghanaian military ruler "one
man one vote is meaningless unless accompanied by one man one
bread."' Although it can be argued that these leaders used the "full belly
thesis" to perpetuate their hold on power, the essence of their argument is
that their legitimate hold on to power is derived from or predicated upon
a continuing delivery of economic development. The economic "miracle"
achieved by South East Asian countries under autocratic or totalitarian
regimes may lend some credence to the forgoing argument. Besides, the
correlation between democracy and development is not emphatically
positive.'47 Two points must, however, be made. First, the absence of
democracy in most African countries has not produced development. In
fact, indicia of development such as GDP growth rate, per capita income,
energy and steel consumption, showed negative values in African
142. See generally ANTON BEBLER, MILITARY RULE IN AFRICA: DAHOMEY, GHANA, SIERRA

LEONE AND MALI (1973).
143. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Democracy, 90 Ah. SOC'Y INT'L LAW
PROCEEDINGS 219 (1996); HODOSON, supra note 128, at 35. Sometimes, discontent may not
manifest in absolute secessionist revolt but internecine violence that would undermine long term
projects. See e.g., Sani Siddiq, WARRI Warriors Target Crucial Gas Project, THE GHANAIAN
CHRONICLE (last modified Mar. 26, 2000) <http://www.ghanaian-chronicle.coml200324/
page2.html>.
144. See Barbara Slavin, 3 Hot Spots of the New Millennium, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 1999, at
IlA.
145. See JULIUS NYERERF, FREEDOM AND DEVELOPMENT 340,370-73 (1973).
146. Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: ShouldEconomicRights Take PriorityOver Civil
and PoliticalRights? Evidencefrom Sub-SaharanAfrica, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 467,467 (1983). In his

first broadcast after usurping power from the constitutionally elected government in Ghana on 31
December 1981, Captain Jerry Rawlings described the constitution as "paper guarantee for abstract
liberties." EMMANUEL DOE ZIORKLUI, GHANA: NKRUMAH TO RAWLINoS 525 (1993).
147. It has been argued that most rich countries are also democratic and most poor countries
are not. See Trebilcock, supra note 24, at 20. See generally G. W. SCULLY, CONSTITUTIONAL
ENVIRONMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROwTH (1992); MAY, supranote 130, at 1-27.
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countries under dictatorship. 148 Furthermore, such countries showed
evidence of blatant corruption, cruelty, inertia and mismanagement.149 For

example, Houphoeit Boigyny of Ivory Coast built a multi-billion dollar
cathedral in an area that is hardly accessible, Mobutu Seseko was reputed
to have kept billions of dollars of his country's money in private European
and American Banks,the same goes for the Duvaliers of Haiti. 0 In other
words, democracy is, at least necessary to constrain corruption and policy
errors.'5' This is because the competition between political parties for
power gives an incentive for reasonably ethical conduct and also provides
the ground for debate and the exploration of ideas." ' Secondly, even in
countries which achieved significant levels of economic development
under totalitarian rule, the call for democratic norms get louder by the day
and the response from the rulers is passive at best.' 3 Some such countries
witnessed violent overthrow of their regimes. 54 It means then that
democratic practice is still necessary as a legitimating factor even when
economic development appeared to have done so.
Sometimes, perception of threats to the stability and legitimacy of a
government or state in the nature of ethnic allegiances or secessionist
maneuvers are cited as the reason for the need to postpone the enjoyment
of freedoms such as association, speech, religion and press, that under-gird
democracy.'" The post-development democracy argument is that in many
developing countries, national allegiance or identification is subordinate
to ethnic or regional identity.'56 For that reason, the grant of democratic

148. See SCULLY, supra note 147. Scully found, in his empirical study of 115 economies
between 1960 and 1980, that societies with high levels of political, civil and economic liberty grew
at three times the rate of societies in which such rights were constrained. See id.
149. See Clark, supra note 75, at 299-306.
150. See id. Countries with a long history of liberal democracy have also been victims of
corruption and mismanagement by their governments. For example, Brian Mulroney of Canada was
alleged to have stashed public money in private bank accounts; see id STEViE CA MRON, ONTHE
TAKE: CRIME GREED AND CORRUPTION INTHE MULRONEY YEARS (1994).
151. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 143, at 83-107; HODoSON, supra note 128, at 36.
152. See generally A. POSONBY, DEMOCRACY AND DIPLOMACY 1, 29 & 116 (1915).
153. See CLARK NEHER, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT iN SoUTHEAST ASIA: THE WINDs
OF CHANGE (1996).
154. See generally N.T. UPHOFF & W.F. LICHMAN, THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF
DEVELOPMENT (1972); Banuri, supra note 77, at 48. The recent political upheavals in Indonesia
and Malaysia support this point.
155. For a discussion of the democracy-secession dilemma, see Diane F. Orentlicher,
SeparationAnxiety: InternationalResponses to Ethno-SeparatistClaims. 23 YALE J. IMNL L. 1
(1998).
156. See JEAN-FRANCOIS BAYART, THE STATE IN AFRICA: THE POLmCs OF THE BELLY 41-59

(1993). Industrialized countries like the United Kingdom and Canada also face secessionist
problems. See e.g., Rhoda Howard, The National Question in Canada:Quebec, 13 HUM. Ris. Q.
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freedoms may exacerbate ethnic divisions and possibly sound the death
knell of the nation state."3 7 The reconstruction of the colonial and postcolonial state therefore required holding democracy in abeyance. Though
there has been cases where countries voted themselves into separation,
imposition of totalitarianism is not necessarily known to have promoted
durable harmonious ethnic relations. In many cases, it can be said to have
postponed open ethnic hostility.' A stability and legitimacy predicated
upon dictatorship is ephemeral, tenuous, and illusory. 0
One fairly incontrovertible means of ensuring the stability and
legitimacy of the state is the promotion of equitable or balanced
development of the entire country. 6 ' Studies have shown that although
democracy does not show an emphatic positive correlation to
development, equitable development is more visible in countries with a
history of democratic governance."" It can be reasoned therefore, that the
more sustainable means of building a united and cohesive nation state is
through the employment of democracy as an instrument. The contribution
or efficacy of democracy in this regard is in two main forms: one by the
election of candidates whose programs respond to or strike a chord with
the aspirations of the people. Second, through such participation, the
people may be socialized into accepting the reasons for a gradualist
approach that may defer the needs or wishes of a constituency in the

interest of a national priority.163 For example, the extension of electric

412, 412-19 (1991). In November 1995,just under 50% of the people in the province of Quebec

voted to secede from Canada. See id
157. See BAYART, supra note 156. See e.g., Howard, supra note 156.
158. For example the Czech and Slovak Republics opted for separation after the fall of
communism.
159. The cases of the former Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R. Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Indonesia and
Rwanda illustrate this point. See generally Slavin, supra note 144.
160. Perhaps this is what U.S. President Woodrow Wilson meant when he declared that "no
peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments
derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed...." Michla Pomerance, The United
States andSelf-Determination:Perspectives on the WilsonianConception, 70 AM. J. INrL L. 2, 2
(1976).
161. See APTER, supra note 71, at 33 (noting that economic failure and inequity are fertile
grounds for revolution).
162. See GEORG SORENSEN, DEMOCRACY, DiCTATORSHw AND DEVELOPMENT 164-91(1991).
163. See HODGSON supra note 128, at 31-32. Stressing the educative value of democratic
debate. The second democratic elections in South Africa illustrate this point where the majority of
the people, including the unemployed and economically deprived, accepted the ANC government's
explanation that the eradication of poverty and its consequences would take time. See Mbekl's
South Africa,THE EcONoMIsr, May 29,1999; see also Africa's DemocraticJoys andTribulations,
THE ECONOMIST,

June 5, 1999. In environmental protection, basic freedoms such as speech, press
and association would facilitate the discussion of the environmental impact of projects. The
constraining of such discussion could sow the seeds of instability for the project. The Gabcikovo-
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power from the main grid to some remote parts of Ghana had to be
suspended because of low water level in the hydro-electric dam.'" The
credibility of that priority setting would be enhanced considerably by the
participation of the people, at least, in electing those who set the priority.
On the other hand, if the needs of an identifiable and "significant" section
of the country are deferred indefinitely, despondency, and apathy may
result and ultimately disenchantment and secessionist thinking. 65 In
centrally planned economies, such needs may be responded to in an overall
development plan. In market economies, the state must at the very
minimum, facilitate the development of laissezfaire basic infrastructure
including energy, transport, and education which have significant
multiplier effect on overall national development. Thus the existence of a
democratic environment, without more, would also not guarantee the long
term stability and equitable development of the state.
Another dimension of the democracy-development debate is its
international or regional implications. The argument that democracies
hardly go to war with each other is yet to be strongly challenged. ' For the
purposes of this work, however, our interest lies principally in the
international economic implications of democratic governance. Since
totalitarian regimes are inherently unsustainable in the long run, economic
relations involving any such regime is likely to be tenuous and
unpredictable. The East African Community flourished and progressed
faster than the European Community in the 1960s and early 1970s, 167 but
its progress was largely halted by the Idi Amin Military dictatorship in
Uganda. 6" In West Africa, the removal of the democratic government
under President Limann by the Rawlings military group in 1981 saw the
withholding of crude oil supplies by Nigeria to Ghana.' 69 Furthermore, the
Nagymaros project is a classic example. See F. Nii Botchway, The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case:
A Step Forwardfor EnvironmentalConsiderationsin the JointDevelopment of Trans-boundary
Resources?, 8 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 78, 78-79 (1999). Amartya Sen argues that famine and

environmental disasters reflect institutional breakdown in accountability and feedback mechanisms.
Amartya Sen, Freedoms and Needs: An Argument for the Primacyof PoliticalRights, in NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 10, 1994 at, 31-38.
164. See A. BREW-HAMMOND, THE POWER SEcTOR IN GHANA (Amer. Assoc. for the
Advancement of Science 1994).
165. See generallyInternationalResponses to Secessionist Conflicts, 90 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L
LAW PROCEEDINGS 266,296-318 (1996); see also Slavin, supra note 144.
166. See Pomerance, supra note 160; see also NEHER & MARLAY, supra note 153, at 1. The
continued tension between Pakistan and India even under democratic governments seems to

undermine this hypothesis.
THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY AND THE COMMON MARKET
167. See INGRID DET
(1970).
168. See NYERERE, supranote 145, at 370-733.
169. See generally KEVIN SHILLINGTON, GHANA AND THE RAWLINGS FACTOR (1992).
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proposed West African Pipeline project has stalled mainly due to the rule
of dictators and consequent instability in the West African region."" The
absence of clear, established and ascertainable governmental mechanism,
procedures for changing governments, lack of faith in the rule of law and
so on, makes it difficult to ascertain the legitimate authority to do business
with. The conclusion ultimately is that, a holistic view of society
engenders both democratic and economic methods of development. That
in the end is what guarantees stability, participation, and legitimacy.
B. Rule of Law

Thus conferred, legitimacy through democracy must also be nurtured
in the context of economic development and by respect for the rule of
law. " ' The meaning of the doctrine of rule of law as an element of good
governance and its operation or significance for economic development is
the subject of the discussion in this section. The modem articulation of the
concept is attributed to Dicey. " He postulated that the rule of law entails
three crucial elements. These are; a) supremacy of the law and absence of
arbitrariness, b) equality before the law, and c) constitutional law as part
of the ordinary law of the land. 3 Since then, the exposition of the concept
has largely revolved around subjecting the government and in particular
the law-makers to the same laws as ordinary people. That is, the
effectiveness of the law in restraining and where necessary punishing
abuse of political power. Considering the historical context in which the
concept was propounded, it is not surprising that its focus was political.
Though some effort has been made since the 1960s to direct the concept
to economic issues, it has largely remained a political imperative. 7 4 This
part of the work re-examines the concept with the aim of giving it an
economic development content.

170. See Resolve Pipeline Issues, DAILY GRAPHIC, (visited Aug. 17, 1999)
<http://www.graphic.com.gh/dgraphic/business/buseco.htmIl>. For a discussion of some of the
political issues in the region and its consequences for the energy industry, see Terry Hallmark,
PoliticalRisks in West Africa: A ComparativeAnalysis, in II OGTLR 399-403 (1998).
171. See the various conceptions of "rule of law" in GEOFFREYDE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF
LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1988); see also 0. HOOD PHILLIPS & PAUL
JACKSON, CONSTITTONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 33-38 (1987).
172. See A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTrrUTION Part
U (1958); WALKER supra note 171, at 19. But rule of law was long conceived and used before

Dicey, PHILLIPS & JACKSON, supra note 171, at 33.
173. See DICEY, supranote 172.
174. Rule oflaw must also involve a primary concern with distributional questions and matters
of social justice. See HELD, supra note 133, at 285.
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One of the primary elements of rule of law is that all laws must be open
and clear." 5 Clarity may be a matter of interpretation and degree, but
secretive law would not enhance good governance since it can easily be
abused by those who enact and apply it.'76 For law to be obeyed, it must
be published and known to the general public particularly those who are
to be guided or affected by it. The establishment of the stock exchange, for
example, must be known, for it to mobilize the necessary interest and
resources. Furthermore, the rules of participation on the market must leave
no doubt as to the consequences of violation. If such rules are not clear and
open, confidence in the stock market and its operation would be
undermined. In addition, the publication of the law must be contextualised
in the particular social economic circumstances. For instance, where
multiple languages are used in a country, it might be necessary to translate
or write the laws in all languages.
Closely related to the foregoing element is the categorical imperative
of the prospectivity of laws. Although business decisions can be taken that
have retrospective effect, for example the remuneration for employees, the
prospect of such decisions are often anticipated at the initiation of the
business or at the beginning of the particular business cycle. If that
happens to be the case with law or a law "confirming" the business plan,
the spirit of the principle is not compromised. Generally, however,
business needs time to adapt to new obligations. Investment decisions are
also made primarily on the basis of the law as it exists and not as it may be
in the future. Where the government, for instance, insists on the location
of energy project in any particular region in response to national priority
demands, this must be made known to prospective independent power
producers by way of laws that look into the future.
In addition, both the legal system and individual laws must be
reasonably stable.'" This point derives directly from the discussion on
democracy as a means of attaining and sustaining stability in governance.
If the legitimacy and stability of the governmental system is predicated on
democracy, that in itself engenders hope for reasonable stability in laws.
Uncertainty regarding the life of a regime discourages long-term business
planning. In Ghana, for example, the Military junta that ruled from 1967

175. The eight-point formulation by Joseph Raz is the primary guide here. See Joseph Raz, The
Rule ofLaw and Its Virtue, 93 LAW Q. REV. 1, 1 (1977). For a discussion and critique of the Raz's
formulation, see WALKER supra note 170, at 21-23. The primary formulation by Dicey and Raz has
been revamped in broader contexts. See e.g., RICHARD S.MARKovrrs, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE:
LEarTIMATE LEGAL ARGUMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 4-5, 55-56 (1998).
176. In the case of Merkur IslandShipping Corp. v. Laughton, 2 AC 570 (1983), Lord Diplock
said "absence of clarity is destructive of the rule of law."
177. Raz, supra note 175, at 199.
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to 1969 pursued massive privatization of state owned enterprises. Two
years later, another Military junta reversed the policy and passed laws
requiring majority state interests in big business enterprises. 78 Apart from
that, the government's annual budget often contains changes to the tax
regime. Such frequent and unpredictable changes discourage long term
business planning as well as blunt the effectiveness of the law itself.""
Energy projects are generally long gestation requiring huge capital with
associated high risks. Investors need broad national stability grounded in
the rule of law." 0 Laws on taxes, wages, the environment, etc. need to be
reasonably stable and predictable. This may not necessarily mean the
perpetual freezing of the relevant law or restraint on Parliamentary
sovereignty and supremacy, but broad consultative processes where basic
freedoms as association, speech and competitive democratic practice exist.
To sustain the long term stability of the legal regime without
compromising the inviolability and stability of specific statutes, it would
be necessary to have general and broad outlines of a principal legislation
which make room for more detailed subsidiary legislation in the nature of
legislative and executive instruments or orders. "' The subsidiary
legislation may be more suitable and convenient for the regulation of
economic activity as it can be reasonably amended without necessarily
affecting the stability of the principal legislation. The amendment can also
be much more specifically done without necessarily opening up the entire
legislation. It must be pointed out, however, that the process of amending
subsidiary legislation may be less open depriving it of the publicity, debate
and educative quality that accompany the main statute. At the same time,
for the purposes of consistency and stability, the subsidiary legislation or
order must not derogate from or be inconsistent with the principal law.
It has been postulated that an essential quality of the concept of rule of
law is that laws must apply equally to everybody. This idea is inherent in
the original political conception of rule of law." 2 It was aimed at
preventing abuse of power by those who govern. " 3 If applied literally in
modem times, its benefit would be the maintenance of the status quo. Its
178. See Amy Chua, Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets and
Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLuM. L. REV. 223, 223 (1995) (recounting similar
practices in Asia and Latin America).
179. This may also implicate insufficient debate, consultation and feedback, improper design
of implementing institutions and therefore erratic or improper implementation. See Trebilcock,
supra note 24, at 40; see also WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1992).
180. See INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION 4 (eds. 1994).
181. See Raz, supra note 175, at 200.
182. See Walker, supra note 171, at 1-42.
183. Governments must be subject to the law like everybody else. So governments can be held

to contracts they voluntarily entered into, as for example the construction of power stations. See id
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/2
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location in formalism assumes that everybody is substantively equal. The
passage of laws to promote or support businesses that are vital for national
security or progress may be seen as violative of the principle. To that
extent, the principle is limited and anachronistic. There are many examples
of laws dealing with specificities rather than general matters. Not only are
such laws necessary but they may also be desirable to address the
particular issue. In order to ameliorate the possible excesses of the review
of the foregoing principles, the resort to principal and subsidiary
legislation would be helpful.
Of course where disputes arise in the general application of the law or
the consistency or otherwise ofthe principal law to the subsidiary law, the
courts must be in a position to pronounce on the relative merits and
legality of the issue. This implicates four imperatives. The courts must be
competent, independent, and accessible and their judgements must be
respected and enforced."U The competence of the courts principally relates
to the judges being well trained and have access to up-to-date relevant
material. The element of rule of law that proscribes expert tribunals is
anachronistic in the context of the late twentieth and the twenty-first
century development models which are largely technology driven. 85
Where necessary, specialized courts such as for tax, industrial disputes,
rent and property rights should be established to speed up the resolution
of such cases."' The process that is established for general judicial
administration with judges trained for general legal practice may not be
facilitative of specialized economic disputes that directly impact
investment and development. Judges in general, however, must be willing
to examine the law from multi-disciplinary perspectives. That would help
locate the law, for example, in the centrality of development goals. The
desirability of an independent judiciary goes without saying. Since the
courts must have the last word on the legal merits of cases before them, it

184. "In the long run, the absence of an independent, professionally competent, and well
respected judiciary represents a serious deficiency in a country's social and economic capital and
is likely to be a significant impediment to economic development." Trebilcock, supra note 24, at
43; D.C. NORM, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990);
0. WILLIAMSON, THE INSTITuTIONS AND GOVERNANCE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM
(UCLA-Berkeley Working Paper, 1994).
185. See PHILLIPS, supra note 171, at 38. For a critique of Dicey's abhorrence for
administrative or specialized courts, see E.C.S Wade, Introduction, in DICEY, supra note 172, at
CXXXV-CL.
186. This has been suggested for the Latin American situation. See generallyWilliam Ratliff
& Edgardo Buscaglia, JudicialReform: InstitutionalizingChangein the Americas,in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 291. Edgardo Buscaglia & Pilar Domingo,
Impediments to JudicialReform in LatinAmerica, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT,

supra note 24, at 313.
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is important that extra judicial influences be reasonably held in check.'"
The traditional means of guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary
include methods of appointment, security of tenure, ways of determining
their salaries and conditions of service.' Accessibility to the courts is
crucial for the operation of rule of law. Courts with summary jurisdiction
in relatively minor matters should exist in areas that are convenient to the
ordinary person. It cannot be over-emphasized that high costs, tedious
processes and long delays may effectively make the rule of law an
illusion.
Respect for court judgments would come from a combination of factors
competence, independence, fairness, etc. In general, courts cannot
enforce or execute the judgments they render. They have to rely on the
executive arm of the government to enforce their decisions. It is in this
context that Dicey called for a separation between the Executive and the
Judiciary. In the context of energy management, not only is the general
judicial system necessary but the establishment of independent or quasiindependent institutions for regulating the industry has become a fairly
common phenomenon."90 Although many of these institutions may be
associated with the Executive arm of government, they are given
significant judicial or quasi-judicial functions. They, for example, have
powers to determine tariff and related disputes, hear the merits of
investment initiatives and conduct inquiries into competition issues. 9 ' In
the performance of these functions, the regulatory body must be
competent, independent, fair, and realistic. In other words, the trappings
of an effective judiciary must attend the operations of the regulatory body.
Rule of law means the subjection of every facet of life to previously
enacted laws, equally and fairly administered and effectively enforced. It
is, however, unrealistic to expect law to cover every conceivable situation
187. See id
188. See id.; see also MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: DELHI APPROVED

STANDARDS, INT'L BAR Assoc. (1982).
189. See Ratliff, supra note 186.
190. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GOVERNANCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

(1997).
191. See Gordon Mackerron & Isabel Boira-Segarra, Regulation, in BRITISH ELECTRICITY
EXPERIMENT PRIVITASATION: THE RECORD, THE ISSUES, THE LESSONS, supra note 85, at 112; see
also Utilities Act,(c 29) 2000 (England and Wales); Public Utilities Regulatory Commission Act,
(Act 538), Section 29-31, 1997 (Ghana). For a classic example of quasi-judicial functions of
Regulatory bodies, see Simon Holberton, Regulator Rejects Electricity Users Pricing Scheme, FIN.
TRES, March 12, 1997, at 9; Simon Holberton, Northern Electric's Fate Hinges on Appeal
Outcome, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23,1996, at 1. More generally, see S.C. Littlechild, New Developments
in Electricity Regulation, in MAJOR ISSUES IN REGULATION, 119 (M.E. Beesley ed. 1993); Sir
Sydney Lipworth, Utility Regulation andthe Monopolies andMergersCommission" Retrospect and
Prospect, in MAJOR ISSUES INREGULATION 39 (M.E. Beesley ed. 1993).
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or fact of life. That could give room for the extreme formalism that is
blamed for totalitarianism which could subvert democracy itself. New
situations arise that law has to catch up with. For example, technological
advancements in information and communication systems, evolving
methods of economic management, regional and international integration
schemes, new systems of tax administration often tend to be ahead of law
as it exists. At the same time, it is on the basis of the law as it exists that
decisions are made. A grey area of law, and no law, or even in the
application of law, has been identified, and that is discretion.
C. Discretion
Following from the discussion on rule of law, the analysis of discretion
would be done in the context of executive policy, legislation and judicial
decisions. In the broader framework of discretion as an element of good

governance and also as an instrument of economic development generally,
and energy management specifically, discretion can be described as the
space between or within rules."9 It is a recognition of the limited capacity
of rules to deal with every conceivable situation. 93 There has been two
extreme positions regarding discretion both as an element of good
governance and as an ingredient of development.'" The first perspective
sees discretion as an aberration on rule and a springboard for arbitrariness,
corruption and unpredictability.' 95 The second view sees discretion as both
inevitable in a body polity and an efficient and realistic mechanism for
development.'" These two perspectives largely underpin the discussion of
discretion in this section of the work. The main argument falls in tandem
with the latter view on discretion. It goes further to evaluate the means of
controlling or ameliorating the excesses of discretionary power. The focus
here would be more on discretion for administrative practice and less on
judicial discretion.'"
192. Craig describes discretion in terms of situations where there is power to make choices
between courses of action or where the end is specified but a choice exists as to how it should be
achieved. See CRAIG, supra note 41, at 384. Craig also discusses the interface between discretion
and rules. Id at 396.
193. See id describing purely rule-based government as an ideal which could never be attained
in any country.
194. See e.g., PHILLIPS & JACKSON, supra note 171, at 37.
195. See JEFFREY JOWELL, LAW AND BEAURACRACY I I (1975) (giving an overview of this
debate); see also D.J. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS 177-83 (1986).
196. See CRAIO, supra note 41, at 396; see also KENNETH DAVIS, DIScRTONARY JUSTICE

(1969) (giving an insight into the debates).
197. With the exception of works such as DISCREIONARY JUSTICE INEUROPE AND AMERICA

(Kenneth Davis ed., 1976), most of the works on discretion looked at it from the perspective of the
judiciary.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

43

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNA77ONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2

[Vol. 13

Provision for discretion can be made explicitly in a statute, rule or
order. It can also be implied or read into statute or administrative or
business practice. Dworkin has propounded three types of discretionary
power: 98 first, weak discretion, where standards exist but there is room for
choice;' second, another weak discretion, where an official has the fimal
authority and final say on the matter;2 and third, strong discretion, where
no standards are prescribed for the official to follow.2"' Most of the
critiques of discretionary power have to do with the last two senses of
Dworkian discretion.
The merits of discretion, however, lie beyond its characterization, its
inevitability or realism. In the first place, discretion responds to some of
the shortcomings of rules. It must be pointed out, however, that the
accommodation of discretion is not incompatible or subversive to the
principle of rule of law.2 2 After all, discretion is mainly provided for by
rules. By far, the most important utility of discretion is its flexibility. The
processes of making rules are often elaborate and time consuming, as is
the process for changing them. Once promulgated, the rules take a long
time to be amended or changed. Unless otherwise stated or implied, the
rules themselves provide for strict application. In the circumstances, the
all-time strict application of the law to all relevant situations is likely to be
unjust, time-consuming and inefficient. To forestall this, the legislature
provides for the exercise of discretion by the persons applying the law in
the light of the particular facts before the decision-maker. For example,
with the rapidly evolving models of infrastructure development such as
Build Operate Transfer (BOT), Build Own Operate and Transfer (BOOT)
and Build Own and Operate (BOO), it would be inefficient for the law to
hold constant a particular form of contractual arrangement.
Closely related to the foregoing is the fact that discretion fills the
vacuum where rules malfunction or work adversely as in cases where the
consequences of the application of rule is patently inconsistent with the
stated purposes of the legislature. Discretion also fills the gap left by
legislators as well as situations where two or more rules contradict each
other. It is impossible for the law-maker to anticipate and provide for all
possible cases where the particular rule covers.2"3 Besides, the very use of

198. See DWORKIN,supra note 116, at 31-39, 68-71.

199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.

202. Admittedly, benefits such as predictability bestowed by strict adherence to rule of law
are somewhat tempered by unstructured discretion or discretion in the third sense stated by
Dworkin. See id.
203. See A.A.M.F. Staatsen, General Assistance in the Netherlands, in DISCRETIONARY
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language is susceptible to ambiguity or omissions.2°4 Furthermore, with the
multiplicity of laws on many varying but interlocking sectors of the
national and international economy, the possibility of conflict between
rules, for example environmental protection and investment promotion, is
real. In such cases, the grant of discretion is a realistic means of dealing
with the matter.
Notwithstanding its utility, if taken too far or granted carte blanche,
discretion can be inimical to efficiency, stability and transparency.
Discretion is prone to ad hoc decision-making. In that case, it does not
lend itself to long term planning and certainty. It is in such circumstances
that it runs counter to the doctrine of rule of law. Besides, it can confer too
much power which could corrupt and be abused. Factors other than
transparent scientific considerations could infect the decision-making
process. For example, major decisions like the extension of electric power
to a rural area could be made on political or sectional motivations instead
of economic basis." 5 At the same time, collection of outstanding bills can
be deferred in ways that could devalue the amount ultimately retrieved.
Fundamentally, the very basis of discretion may be questioned if it is
seen as derogating from the tenets of democracy. As already noted, one of
the principal reasons for democratic political system is the attainment of
legitimacy and stability. That legitimacy conferred by the election of
legislators would be undermined if the connection between the persons
exercising the discretion, and the exercise of the discretion itself, is viewed
as tenuous or weak. This is because there could be significant shifts in
power bases between the elected representatives and un-elected
bureaucrats by virtue of discretionary power. The issue then is how much
of discretionary power is sufficient. The answer lies in an admixture of
rules and discretion with major emphasis on rules.
Beyond emphasis on rules, discretion can be controlled in a number of
ways. Three main means of restraining discretion have been identified as
Confining, Structuring, and Checking." 6 Discretion, to be effective and

JUSTICE INEUROPE AND AMERICA, supra note 197, at 139.
204. See Karl Meesen, The Application of the Antitrust Rules of the EEC Treaty by the
Commission ofthe EC, in DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE INEUROPE AND AMERICA, supra note 197, at
79-80, outlining some words in EC legislation that are suggestive of discretion.
205. This happened in Kenya and the Ivory Coast. See F. Nii Botchway, The Role of the State
andGovernancein Energy Resource Management: Comparative AntecedentsandCurrent Trends,
21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 781, 781 (Winter 2000). A similar situation was averted when the UK
government withdrew its insistence on locating a well on its half of the Frigg gas field on political
grounds. See Ian Townsend Gault, Offshore Petroleum Exploration, in PETROLEUM INVESTMENT
POLICIES INDEVELOPING COUNTRIES 147 (Nicky Beredjick & Thomas Walde eds., 1987).
206. See DAVIS, supra note 196. See application of the three methods in the European context
in Meesen, supra note 204, at 81-90.
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tolerable, must be confined within necessary bounds and those aspects of
discretion that may not be necessary, pruned. First, this may be achieved
by establishing standards and rules for the exercise of discretion. "°
Second, discretion can be structured by prescribing the processes for the
exercise of discretion. These can be done by requiring reasons to be given,
open and transparent policies, rules, findings, and resort to precedents? 8
And third, some of the excesses of discretion can be checked by a process
of hierarchical supervision. The common structure for supervising
discretion is by the court system or administrative tribunal. In other words,
finality of discretionary power would not rest with the primary decisionmaker."° The courts have established three main grounds for reviewing
discretion." These are the way in which the discretion has been exercised
or non-exercise of discretion, factors that were considered or implicated
in the discretion, and whether the exercise of the discretion is
reasonable. 21
Discretion can be further managed by a variety of mechanisms. These
include the power of appointment ofthe decision-maker. Generally, people
who are expected to reason in a certain way or in a manner that the person
appointing approves of, are appointed to positions where they have to
exercise discretion.212 Direct or indirect pressure can be brought to bear on
the decision-maker as for example budgetary or disciplinary controls.
Procedural requirements such as the type of evidence to be presented or
relied upon and the manner of publishing the decision can fetter discretion.
Social processes can also affect discretion significantly. The training of

lawyers, organizational sub-culture, inter-organizational coordination and
the possibility of criticisms of decisions, can all direct the manner of

exercising discretion.2" 3
The outlined means of restraining the excesses of discretionary power
should make its working more acceptable without constraining the
efficiency of the operations of the energy sector. Discretion is visible and
somewhat necessary at varying junctures of energy resource development
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. For an exhaustive and recent analysis of these grounds, see P.P. CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 579-654 (4th ed. 1999).
211. See CRAIG, supra note 41, at 384; see also MARTIN LOUGHLIN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
MODERN STATE 70-80 (1986).

212. This is very common in appointments to the judiciary. There are rare examples where the
appointee did not exercise the discretion in the direction expected by the person who appointed him
or her. See Carl Schneider, Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View, in THE USES OF DISCRETION
79-80 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992).
213. See HAwKNS, id. at 5.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss2/2

46

GOOD GOVERNANCE

Botchway: Good Governance: The Old, the New, the Principle and the Elements

and management. The fundamental question of domestic generation of
power as against buying from another country, or more commonly, the
determination of the source to be tapped for the energy, whether from
hydro, gas, geothermal, nuclear or solar, though grounded in engineering
and technical circumstances, also invites discretionary tendencies. The
exercise of that discretion may be influenced by not only economic and
technical considerations but also by political motivations. For example, the
first assessment of the Volta River in Ghana for hydro-electric energy
resulted in a determination by the colonial government that it was not
feasible. 14 About a decade later, the Nkrumah independence government
reassessed the project and determined it to be viable and feasible.
Similarly, the British government initially insisted on having, at least, a
well drilled and a rig located on its side of the North Sea energy field
which it shares with Norway, for largely political reasons, though it was
technically unnecessary." 5 The location of the plant, or of the major part
of the project, is therefore another point where discretion is exercised.
Thirdly, determination of the priority of access to energy resources though

significantly based on economic and technical considerations is also a
discretionary exercise. For example, Akosombo township was the first to
receive electricity from the Volta hydro electric project and to date enjoys
uninterrupted power supply even when the rest of Ghana is having power
rations, mainly because it bore the environmental and social brunt of the
construction of the dam and its maintenance. Similarly, the decision to
accord priority of power supply to Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso and the

Volta Aluminum Company is both an economic as well as political
decision with patent discretionary flavor. Finally, the formula for
determining the tariffs for electricity is not without discretionary elements.
Three methods can be used in power tariff determination: efficiency (RPIX) method, rate of return, and marginal costs plus fixed operating costs.2" 6

The third method may lead to comparatively higher rates.2" In economies
where consumption surplus is almost non-existent, reliance on that formula
could result in low patronage of the power services and/or political
tensions. Such countries therefore tend to rely on the short run marginal
cost formula. This may prolong the recovery of the initial investment and
consequently unattractive to private investors in energy. The choice is
therefore technical, economic, as well as a political and social one with far
214. See generally JAMES MOXON, VOLTA: GREATEST MAN MADE LAKE (1994).
215. See Gault, supra note 205.
216. See CHARLEs J. GicCHETT & WILLIAM GILLEN, THE MARGINAL COST AND PRICING OF
ELECrmcrrY (1977); Mackerron & Boira-Segarra, supranote 191, at 101.
217. See GICCHErrl & GILLEN, supra note 216; see Mackerron & Boira-Segarra, supra note
191, at 101.
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reaching ramifications. The legitimacy of making choices as exercise of
discretion can be enhanced by the involvement of the stakeholders in the
subject matter. One way of accessing their participation is by
decentralizing the structures of operation.
D. Decentralization
The discussion of discretion and its practical exercise in itself implies

or assumes the delegation or decentralization of authority and
responsibility. 2 This may manifest in a variety of contexts. In the light of
the instant work, using governance as a framework for analyzing energy
resource management, we would examine delegation or decentralization
from two primary perspectives. These are decentralization as a conceptual
element of governance and decentralization as a possible mechanism for
efficient and equitable energy resource development. First, a brief of two
viewpoints on decentralization.
In the contemporary discourse on decentralization, two main strands
are outstanding. These are the neo-liberal or mainstream economic
approach, and a political economy approach.2" 9 The former commences its
conception of decentralization with a search for the form of government
that would attain the most equitable distribution of income, the
maintenance of stable economy and the efficient allocation of resources.22 °
To that end, they first make the case for centralization on the basis of its
stabilizing function, for example in monetary policy, its co-ordinative and
standardizing benefits. Decentralization is permissible to the extent that it
reduces costs, promotes or facilitates optimum production and does not
subvert the supra structural arrangement for stability and predictability.
The political economy school's view of decentralization appears to be
more broad-based. The school examines decentralization not from merely
a narrow economic perspective, but also takes account of its political
implications."' Decentralization is seen as a means of allocating political
and economic power to central and local government and institutions.222

218. LOUGHLiN, supra note 211, at 3.
219. See RATHIN ROY, ON THETEORY OF DECENTRALIZATION: A CRIQUEOF MAINSTREAM
EcONOMICS AND TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 1-4 (SOAS, Dept.
of Economics, Working Paper Series No. 69). Others classify it in terms of tradition, function, and
autonomy. See LOUGHIN,supra note 211, at 1-4.
220. See ROY, supra note 219, at 1-4.
221. See id.
222. This is especially so in modern complicated governance. See LOUGHLIN, supra note 211,
at I. The reasons or goals of decentralization include diffusion of political power including the
raising of political awareness, distribution, improvement and accountability in public services. See
Robin Hambleton & Paul Hoggett, Decentralization: Theses and Issues, in THE POLITICS OF
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Specific issues, for instance, local revenue mobilization in the form of
taxes could be ceded to the local political base. There is a recognition by
both schools of the possible and often real conflicts and tensions between
the powers and functions of the central government and those of the local
government. 3 The settlement of these tensions in societies that are
economically, politically, and socially diverse, is at best a continuum that
defies universal solution.224
Notwithstanding this recognition, the two schools on decentralization
fail in other major respects. First, they do not allocate sufficient
consideration to decentralization as a means of countervailing political and
economic corruption which largely results from absolutism. Absolutism
is often a feature of centralization and manifests in the form of
dictatorship, economic imbalance and ultimately political and economic
instability. As already noted, one reason for this is that dictatorship may
produce growth but hardly meaningful development. In that regard, with
the limitation on debate and other freedoms, local peculiarities may be unaddressed and therefore suppression becomes an important tool of shortterm stability. Decentralization in the form of local autonomy and power
sharing could work as a counter weight to central absolutism and ensure
the long-term stability of the state." Additionally, decentralization can
facilitate accountability from both central and local leaderships.
Secondly, the economic and political economy approaches to
decentralization are conspicuously silent on the role of law in the
decentralization arrangements. 226 Admittedly, most of the theorists come
to the subject from non-law background and their objective also appears
less law focused. If they did otherwise, they would have realized that the
first step in the decentralization process is a fundamental rearrangement
of the existing constitutional order.2 7 This is what is described in some
circles as devolution- the legal process of shifting responsibilities and
functions from the center to the periphery."' Furthermore, the operation
DECENTRALISATION" THEORY AND PRACTICE OF A RADICAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE 5

(Robin Hambleton & Paul Hoggett eds., 1984).
223. This is the autonomy issue that Loughlin pursues. See LOUGHLIN, supra note 211, at 7080.
224. The problems in Northern Ireland (UK), Quebec (Canada), Aceh (Indonesia) and Niger
Delta (Nigeria) illustrate the complex and diverse nature of the circumstances that may under-gird
decentralization.
225. See LOUGHLIN, supra note 21i, at 1.
226. See id, at 2-4; see also James Paul & Clarence Dias, State-ManagedDevelopment: A
Legal Critique,in LAW AND DEVELOPEMENT, supra note 32, at 279-302.

227. Loughlin notes the fact that local government or decentralized units are statutory bodies
and therefore come within the purview ofjudicial review. See LOUGHLIN, supra note 211, at 2.
228. See generally J.P. MACKINTOSH, THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER (1968); GORDON BROWN
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of the decentralized mechanisms must be firmly grounded in law. This
would engender the cultivation and realization of all the benefits of rule of
law. In sum, the reasons for decentralization are political legitimacy
through participation, sensitivity to local peculiarities and efficiency.
A common denominator of all democratic systems of government is
participation by the governed in the appointment and removal of their
governors. This can be argued to be insufficient for the continuing
reconciliation or harmonization of diverse interests. Structures variously referred to as councils, boroughs, counties, cantons, wards etc.
- are therefore created as fora for the continuing engagement of both
local and national politics. These structures may serve as channels for a
two-way communication between the governed and governors. Secondly,
it can help check abuse of power by the central government by serving as
both point for organizing and as buffer against the weight of government.
Thirdly, the local structures would help mobilize opinion and resources for
the community's development.
Closely related to the foregoing, the establishment of structures for
decentralized governance helps sensitize the central government to local
or regional peculiarities. In other words, local problems may be addressed
by the community and central government in ways that are not inconsistent
with the aspirations of the people. The needs of people in a country can
vary widely. For instance, in Mexico, ninety percent of the population in
urban areas have access to potable water, but only forty-nine percent of
rural dwellers have clean water. 2 Industries like electricity can be a
response to local demands by either an extension of existing grid or by the
construction of a facility geared towards the circumstances of the region
or community. It is situations like these that result in multiple sources of
electricity in one country.
Decentralization of electricity services can come about either by
autonomous power utilities establishing in outlying areas of the country,
or by major, often monopolistic utilities establishing branches in areas
outside the big cities. It is not clear which of the two systems is more
efficient in terms of profitability, stability or security of supply and
accessibility. The merit of a major utility establishing regional branches lie
in the comfort of the existence of reserve capacity, established national or
international reputation and possibility of cross subsidies to enhance price
& H.M. DRUCKER, THE POLmcs OF NATIONALISM AND DEVOLUTION (1980).
229. See Jose Esteban Castro, Decentralization and Modernization in Mexico: The
Management of Water Services, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 466-67 (1995). High on the priority of
needs of the rural communities in Ghana are electric power, piped water, education facilities and
industries. These are remarkably different from those of the urban areas which include telephones,
traffic decongestion, and jobs.
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accessibility in less economically prosperous regions. On the other hand,

its size may preclude detail and regular attention to local peculiarities.
Autonomous utility units may also have the advantage of fostering a sense
of community ownership and sensitivity to local needs. The concern,
however, is the possibility of local utility units becoming loci for local
political power play. This was obtained in France prior to nationalization
in 1946, and the determination to prevent a repetition resulted in a
horizontal integration of EDF and Gaz de France for the purposes of power
distribution.2s ° Whatever the case, it is crucial that national efforts be made

" ' These efforts must
towards universal accessibility to electricity services.23
have legitimacy not only in the political process, but also consolidated in
the national legal ethic, constitutionally or by means of legislation. That,

in the end would manifest a realization of the good governance ideal of
political and economic participation through law.
VI. CONCLUSION

This article discussed governance mainly at a theoretical level. It
established that the idea of good governance is not new to the last decade
of the twentieth century nor attributable to the World Bank and other
development institutions. What constitutes the ingredients of good
governance -, elected government, effective bureaucracy, rule of law,
discretion, decentralization - were very palpable in Weberian work and
the work of the Law and Development, or Modernization movements.
Notwithstanding that finding, important differences between the "two
phases" of good governance were noted. This work also attempted to limit
what should be the elements of the contemporary good governance
discourse. The "elevation" of good governance to the position of a
principle not only legitimizes its status as an inexorable and self-evident
truth or standard but also grounds the emanation of constituent elements
to concretize it. The elements considered important include competitive
democracy, the rule of law, effective bureaucracy, discretion and
decentralization.
Democratic governance allows for the election of representatives who
may reflect the concerns of the particular electorate. In that case, a
230. See EUGENE CROSS, ELEcRImc UTILITY REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 39-42

(1996);

ROBERT

L. FROST, ALTERNATING

CURRENTS: NATIONALISED POWER IN FRANCE

1946-

1970, at 79-80 (1991).
231. This can be, as in the case of Malaysia, by means of encouraging private utility interests
to locate in outlying or otherwise deprived areas, or, as in the case of Ghana, by encouraging the
national power utility to operate or establish branches in hitherto deprived areas. See e.g. Japan
Will NOT Give Loans to Ghana under HIPC, (last modified Mar. 27, 2001)
<http'j/www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID= 14362>.
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community which is uniquely impacted by an energy project or which
reckons that benefits they receive from the project is disproportionate to
its location and contribution may have avenues for expression and redress.
At the same time, they could also be socialized into accepting the practical
realities of the national economy and the functional imperatives of the
project. This would help strengthen the stability and legitimacy of the state
and government without sacrificing broad equitable ends. Democratic
governance would be underpinned by the rule of law, which would ensure
stability of the relations that impact on an energy project. Although, the
concept of rule of law requires the "codification" of the law, it does not
preclude discretion vested in the governing or administrative authorities.
In the energy industry, discretion is necessary for the choice of the source
to tap the energy from, the determination of the corporate vehicle or
method to exploit the resources and crucially, the regulatory trajectories
of the industry as for example the determination of the method for
regulating tariffs. Furthermore, administrative or governmental discretion
must be subject to review by an independent judiciary. All these, would
undoubtedly, be facilitated by an effective, and for the particular purposes
of the energy industry, technically proficient, and independent
bureaucracy.
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